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I.
INTRODUCTION

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court put nonparticipatory association and
compelled political speech at the heart of campaign finance jurisprudence.' In its
zeal to abolish distinctions between natural persons and corporations in
Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D.,
Harvard University.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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campaign finance law, the Court amplified the political speech rights of
corporations and constrained the associational and political speech rights of the
shareholders and members who form and fund corporations.
Before Citizens United, federal election law prohibited the use of
corporations' general treasury funds for independent expenditures that expressly
supported or opposed the election of clearly identified candidates for public
office. 2 The only way for a corporation to expressly support candidates was
through the corporation's political action committee ("PAC").3 In effect, federal
election law operated as a clause in corporate articles or bylaws that protected
shareholders and members from managerial discretion in using corporate assets
to support or oppose political candidates through independent expenditures.
Citizens United removed this implicit term from the articles or bylaws of every
corporation and association in the country and thereby changed the relationship
between organizations and their members. 4 Following Citizens United,
independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
particular candidate may be funded directly from a corporation's general
treasury. Members and shareholders have no effective means of consenting or
not consenting to the decisions made by organization managers with respect to
the use of general treasury funds.5
The changes Citizens United made to the terms of association are profound
for shareholders or members who affiliated with an association for purposes
other than political expression. An individual who buys stock in a business
corporation is likely to have made the investment for the straightforward purpose
of earning a return on the investment, not for the purpose of supporting or
opposing a particular candidate. An individual who makes a contribution to a
tax-exempt entity may be presumed to have done so to support the
organization's exempt purpose, whether to protect the environment, maintain a
local park, or improve conditions in the local business community. These
shareholders and members now find that virtually all associations can allocate
2. See Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) § 316, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidatedin
part by Citizens United v. Fed Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down restrictions
on independent expenditures but not with respect to contributions to candidates).
3. Corporate-controlled PACs are funded by contributions, subject to limitations as to the
amount, the frequency of solicitation, and the persons whom the PAC can solicit. In these senses,
corporate-controlled PACs preserve an element of volition absent from the managers' use of the
corporation's general treasury funds for express advocacy. For regulations defining the operation
of corporate or union-controlled PACs, see generally 11 C.F.R. § 114.6(a) (2010), 11 C.F.R. §
114.6(b) (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 114.7 (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 114.8 (2010) . The name of a controlled
PAC must include the name of its sponsoring organization. 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(5) (2006); 11 C.F.R.
§ 102.14(c) (2010).
4. The terms "members" and "shareholders" are used in a generic sense and not in a technical
sense throughout this Article, which does not address the important issue of the diverse
relationships between types of entities and those persons that support, identify with, affiliate with,
contribute funds to, or acquire some form of financial interest in the entity.
5. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913, overruling McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n (2003)
with respect to independent expenditures but not with respect to contributions to candidates.
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organizational resources to supporting or opposing candidates in election
campaigns, regardless of whether the candidates' positions are consistent with
the exempt activity of the organization or the commercial activities of the
business corporation. 6
These changes are also profound for members who did affiliate with an
association for the purpose of political expression, but not necessarily for the
purpose of supporting or opposing particular candidates. It is entirely possible to
support a cause and to pay dues or make contributions to support legislative
lobbying or issue advertisements without wanting to support or oppose particular
candidates for public office, or even wanting to support any candidates at all. An
association may be devoted to a single cause, or even to a single approach to a
single cause, but a candidate necessarily takes positions on many issues. Even a
strong supporter of a particular cause may not attract the votes of ardent
supporters of that cause if those supporters object to the candidate's position on
other issues. In order to understand the nature of compelled political speech
arising from this change in the terms of association, it is necessary to remember
that the choice a given voter makes about which candidate to vote for-or even
whether to vote at all-is a highly complex decision made by individual voters
in different ways, weighing different factors.7
Citizens United is thus an important case in the jurisprudence of association.
Members and shareholders will now find that the money they contributed to, or
invested in, an organization is being used to finance political speech with which
they may not agree. The majority opinion does not address this change in the
scope of managerial discretion as an element of the right of association. Instead,
it treats corporate decisions relating to political speech as indistinguishable from
other corporate decisions over which corporate managers exercise control. The
6. Whether various types of corporate entities will, in fact, use general treasury funds to
finance independent expenditures will become apparent in future elections. It will also become
apparent whether the limitations on the use of general treasury funds for independent expenditures
will cause increased rent-seeking, a form of monetizing public office, by officeholders seeking to
finance their political campaigns. Enhancing opportunities for rent-seeking increases the influence
of those who finance candidates relative to those who vote for candidates. Rent-seeking raises
practical problems relating to lobbying that are beyond the scope of this Article, but not beyond the
scope of legitimate concerns arising from the Court's decision in Citizens United. For an analysis
of the economics of rent-seeking, see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS,
RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).

7. For an analysis of voting decisions, see SAMUEL L. POpKIN, THE REASONING VOTER:
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (1991).

8. Both taxable business corporations and nonprofit advocacy organizations operate through
managerial control, relatively weak boards, and shareholders or members with few rights to
participate in organizational governance. While shareholders in business corporations vote for
members of their boards and on certain issues specified in the corporations' organizing documents,
most nonprofit advocacy organizations have no members with similar voting rights. The boards of
nonprofit advocacy organizations are self-perpetuating institutions that elect their own successors,
or reelect themselves. For an analysis of managerial control that remains useful for understanding
both business corporations and nonprofit advocacy organizations, see generally ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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Citizens United majority thus ignored the role of member and shareholder
consent in organizations' decisions relating to the use of general treasury funds
to finance independent expenditures. Political speech has become another area of
nonparticipation in organizational decision-making, and the resulting speech is a
form of compelled political speech from the perspective of shareholders. 9
Citizens United is also important for the jurisprudence of association
because of what the Court did not do. The Court in Citizens United never paused
to consider whether nonparticipatory association was consistent with the First
Amendment values they claimed to be protecting. 10 The Court never asked
whether the shareholders and members should be considered speakers with
protected First Amendment rights. It did not locate the First Amendment in the
Constitution, and did not understand the Constitution as a document intended to
establish a legitimate government based on consent. It did not consider the
implications of nonparticipatory association and compelled political speech for
the rights of individuals as voters. The Court never stopped to consider whether
its decision might have implications for the nature of the relationship between
voters and elected representatives.
The Citizens United majority was able to ignore the need for consent by
association members while enhancing the control of organizational managers
because the jurisprudence of association currently does not acknowledge and
protect both the rights of the association and the rights of those who associate.
Any theory of association consistent with the constitutional principle of consent
should consider associations as both entities and aggregates. It should grapple
with a range of difficult questions about the entity itself and the aggregate
character of associations. Does the association's right of political speech derive
from -the First Amendment rights of its members? Or do organizations enjoy
First Amendment rights of political speech wholly separate and independent
from those of its members? Do individuals have their First Amendment rights of
political speech diminished by the act of joining an association? What are the
means through which members can express consent to the role of associations in
campaign finance?
This Article suggests that the implications of Citizens United for the
jurisprudence of association become clearer and more concrete if one treats
consent as a constitutional principle. Treating consent as a constitutional
9. For a critical analysis of managerial control of corporate political speech, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., CorporatePoliticalSpeech: Who Decides?, 124 HARv. L. REv.
83(2010).
10. For a strong argument that First Amendment speech jurisprudence should be based on
democratic legitimation, see Robert Post, A ProgressivePerspective on Freedom of Speech, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020 179, 179-86 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). Post reasons
that "[d]emocracy is most fundamentally about self-government. It is about ensuring that the
people are sovereign, that government is responsive to their wishes, and that citizens experience
the government as their own. This view of democracy implies that First Amendment jurisprudence
must ultimately be based on the political ground of popular sovereignty, rather than on the
cognitive ground of accurate popular decision making." Id. at 181.
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principle provides a conceptual framework for challenging the use of the First
Amendment as the constitutional predicate for nonparticipatory association that
results in compelled political speech. Treating consent as a constitutional
principle leads one to ask who is a speaker under the First Amendment. Do
individuals lose their rights of political speech when they invest in business
corporations or contribute to nonprofit organizations? How can individuals use
associations to amplify their voices in political campaigns? Treating consent as a
constitutional principle also leads to questions about the relationship between
political speech during campaigns and the nature of representation once the
election is over. If voters have little role as speakers during election campaigns,
does this dilute the power of their vote as a mechanism for holding elected
representatives accountable and thereby ensuring the legitimacy of
government?" What is the operational relationship between consent and
legitimate government?
Consent is not the only constitutional principle important to understanding
the relationship between campaign finance and government legitimacy. As
Justice Souter has emphasized, the Constitution embraces a multiplicity of
desirable values, not all of which are simultaneously achievable. 12 As he notes,
"[t]he Constitution is a pantheon of values, and a lot of hard cases are hard
because the Constitution gives no simple rule of decision for the cases in which
one of the values is truly at odds with another." 1 3 While the First Amendment
provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech,"1 4 "no law" does not mean exactly, literally, and absolutely "no law."
The First Amendment Speech Clause is necessarily read as part of both the First
Amendment, which includes the Assembly Clause, and the Constitution as a
whole.1 5 While Justice Souter focused on the publication of the Pentagon Papers
11. For an analysis of inequality of wealth expressed through campaign contributions and
expenditures, see J. Skelly Wright, Money and the PollutionofPolitics: Is the FirstAmendment an
Obstacle to PoliticalEquality? 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 609 (1982) (expressing concern that "the
voices of individual citizens are being drowned out in elections campaigns"). Judge Wright said of
political campaigns: "If the ideal of equality is trampled there, the principle of 'one person, one
vote,' the cornerstone of our democracy, become a hollow mockery." Id.
12. Justice David H. Souter, Harvard's 3 59 h Commencement Address, 124 HARv. L. REV.
429, 433 (2010).
13. Id. at 435.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. In developing his analysis, Justice Souter rejected what he labeled the "fair reading
model," which he described as "the notion that all of constitutional law lies there in the
Constitution waiting for a judge to read it fairly." Souter, supra note 12, at 434. As an example of
the limits of the fair reading model and of the importance of understanding the role of
constitutional values, Justice Souter examined the interpretation of the First Amendment in the
Pentagon Papers case. He argued that the Court did not base its decision in that case on a literalist
or absolutist reading of the First Amendment, stating that "[t]he court did not decide the case on
the ground that the words 'no law' allowed of no exception and meant that the rights of expression
were absolute." Id. at 433. According to Justice Souter, "[t]he court's majority decided only that
the government had not met a high burden of showing facts that could justify a prior restraint." Id
He concluded:
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in his First Amendment analysis, 16 the same approach applies to understanding
the First Amendment in the context of campaign finance. Nothing in the
Constitution supports a reading of the First Amendment Speech Clause that does
not take into account consent and other Constitutional values as well.
This Article explores the relationship between nonparticipatory association
and compelled speech through a framework based on consent as a constitutional
principle. Part II discusses consent as a constitutional principle. Part III discusses
the attenuated development of the jurisprudence of association. Part IV analyzes
the concept of participatory association and its relationship to compelled
political speech. Part V analyzes Citizens United in terms of the failure of
associational consent. Part VI explores potential operational remedies to the
negation of consent in Citizens United. Part VII concludes with a brief
observation on developing a jurisprudence of participatory association based on
consent.
II.
CONSENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

As a constitutional principle, consent is the basis of government legitimacy.
In operational terms, the constitutional principle of consent requires that citizens
have meaningful opportunities for participation in shaping government policies
either individually or through organizations that express their points of view.
This Part explores the principle of consent in the text of the Constitution and in
the operation of constitutional government over time. Treating consent as a
constitutional principle means understanding consent as a permanent part of
constitutional structure. Consent did not begin and end with ratification of the
Constitution. Consent is a continuing process based on participation in
government and in the organizations through which Americans attempt to
influence the operation of their government.
The Constitution begins with an assertion and affirmation of consent: "We
the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." 17 The purposes to which the people consented are
public purposes-"to form a more perfect Union" and "to establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the

Even the First Amendment, then, expressing the value of speech and publication in the
terms of a right as paramount as any fundamental right can be, does not quite get to the
point of an absolute guarantee. It fails because the Constitution has to be read as a
whole, and when it is, other values crop up in potential conflict with an unfettered right
to publish . . .. The explicit terms of the Constitution, in other words, can create a
conflict of approved values, and the explicit terms of the Constitution do not resolve
that conflict when it arises.
Id. The same approach applies to understanding the First Amendment in the context of campaign
finance.
16. Id. at 433-34.
17. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity."' 8 This was an ambitious agenda when the Constitution was ratified
and remains so today. In its first sentence, the Constitution asserted that both the
document itself and the government established by it were based on the consent
of the people.
The affirmation and assertion of consent in the first sentence of the
Constitution was by no means unprecedented, or even particularly innovative,
when the drafters of the Constitution met in Philadelphia. The Declaration of
Independence stated that it was "self-evident" that governments should be
understood as "deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."' 9
As Pauline Maier has observed, by the time the Declaration of Independence was
written, "the ideas in the Declaration's second paragraph were so broadly shared
that their statement seemed commonplace .
20 Quoting Thomas Jefferson's
comment that the Declaration of Independence was "to be an expression of the
American mind," Maier concludes that "as a statement of political philosophy,
the Declaration was therefore purposely unexceptional in 1776.",21
The Declaration of Independence not only based the legitimacy of
government on consent, but also affirmed the right of the people to continue to
consent or not as they saw fit. Among the "self-evident truths" enumerated in the
Declaration of Independence was the assertion:
"..

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 2 2

18. Id.
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The context of this affirmation
of consent as the foundation of government legitimacy is familiar but bears repeating:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Id.
20. Pauline Maier, The Strange History of "All Men Are CreatedEqual," 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 873, 877 (1999) [hereinafter Maier, Strange History].
21. PAULINE MATER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
xvii (1997) [hereinafter MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE].
22. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2. The text continues with a Lockean limitation

balancing change with continuity when possible:
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed
for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience has shown, that mankind
are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and
to provide new Guards for their future security.
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Thus consent, as the Founders understood it, is a principle of active and
continuing participation that established government legitimacy.
The Declaration of Independence was not the only document that invoked
the principle that consent is the basis of legitimate government. Pauline Maier
traces the influence of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was regarded at
the time as a more eloquent and comprehensive statement of consent and
fundamental rights, on the drafting of new state Declarations or Bills of Rights
based on the principle of consent. 2 3 The new state constitutions drafted after
independence had been declared also expressed principles of consent and
participation, but did not treat the Declaration of Independence as having set
forth a new theory of legitimate government. 24
The drafters of the Constitution also grounded the legitimacy of their
revised plan of self-government on that same principle of consent. The
Constitution provided for initial ratification,25 the ratification of amendments,26
and convening another constitutional convention. 2 7 The text of the Constitution
thus expressly embraces a principle of continuing consent. 28 The ratification of
the Constitution through conventions in each of the states was intended to
demonstrate that consent, and hence the legitimacy of the new government. 29
Pauline Maier describes the process of ratification as "how 'We the People'
decided whether or not to ordain and establish the Constitution of the United
States." 3 0 Akhil Amar similarly describes ratification as "a deed-a
constituting" by the people. 3 1 Ratification was debated in conventions in the
various states. Amar describes these conventions as representing the people
Id. This language invokes the concepts and language of JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 406-28 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Akhil Amar argues
that the Constitution was more radical than the Declaration of Independence because it did not
require evidence of "a long train of abuses" as a precondition to changing the government. AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 12-13 (2005),
23. Maier, Strange History, supra note 20, at 877-79.
24. MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE, supra note 21, at 163-64. See also Gordon S. Wood, The

Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1432-22 (1999).
25. U.S. CONST. art. VII. Akhil Amar describes the Preamble and Article VII as "bookends."
AMAR, supra note 22, at 29

26. U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress . .. shall propose Amendments to this Constitution").
27. Id. ("The Congress . . . [shall propose amendments or] shall call a Convention for
proposing amendments").
28. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 471. Amar describes the Preamble as "the Founder's
foundation" and ratification as "the real constitutional drama." Id. at 468. To him, the Constitution
is "a democratic and intergenerational project." Id. at 476.
29. See id. at 7-8 (quoting Federalist Papers Number 40 as stating that without the approval
of "the people themselves," the Constitution would "be of no more consequence than the paper on
which it is written").
30. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION ix (2010).

[hereinafter MAIER, RATIFICATION] (providing a detailed analysis of the ratification processes in

Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and less detailed discussions of ratification processes in the
other states).
31. AMAR, supra note 22, at 5.

14qngddithlPnmi i.m1of)Nt.NeRevink bnvsySdiabhflgov

558

N.Y U. RE VIEW OF LA W & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 35: 550

"more directly than ordinary legislatures" but noted the difference between the
conventions and a referendum. 32 While women, slaves, and Native Americans
played no part in this process, or in the political life of the new republic, the
process of ratification was still more participatory and gave more operational
meaning to the concept of consent than had any other process to date, including
the processes by which most state constitutions had been adopted. Ratification
was achieved through a process involving sharp disagreements and vigorous
debate. 33 The Founders and the people of the United States at the time of
ratification were thus committed to the constitutional principle of consent, which
was expressed through active and continuing participation and provided the basis
for legitimate government. The result was, in Amar's words, that "[p]reamblestyle popular sovereignty was an ongoing principle." 34
In his important and provocative study of consent and the Constitution,
Larry Kramer claims that the people of the United States were quite aware of
their role in founding and shaping their government:
Americans of the Founding era reveal how they understood their role in
popular government in ways that we, who take so much for granted, do
not. The United States was then the only country in the world with a
government founded explicitly on the consent of its people, given in a
distinct and identifiable act, and the people who gave that consent were
intensely, profoundly conscious of the fact. And proud. This pride, this
awareness of the fragility and importance of their venture in popular
government, informed everything the Founding generation did.3 5
Kramer emphasizes the continuing role of the people in interpreting and
implementing the Constitution. 36 He states that when the drafters of the
Constitution referred to "the people," they were referring to actual living,
participating, debating, disputing, contentious people and "not conjuring an
empty abstraction or describing a mythic philosophical justification for

32. Id. at 7.
33. See MAIER, RATIFICATION, supra note 30, at 1787-88 (2010).
34. AMAR, supra note 22, at 10.
35. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEw 5 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES]. Akhil Amar also
emphasizes the role of the people as conscious political actors in a historical transformation. See
AMAR, supra note 22, at 13 ("Americans understood this transformation even as they were doing
the transforming and marveling at their own handiwork.").
36. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 35 at 8. For a discussion of what he sees
as the disengagement of the people from active participation in democratic governance at the very
time that democratic institutions are spreading around the world, see Larry D. Kramer, Political
Organization and the Future of Democracy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN2020, supra note 10, at 167,
167-78. Kramer expresses the concern that "[1]eaders in the twenty-first century reach out to
constituents primarily through the national media, apparently content to establish 'personal'
contact through forms of address that are, in fact, one-sided and anything but personal." Id. at 176.
Kramer concludes that "[p]olitics today has thus become a remote, passive activity for most of us."
Id.
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government." 3 7
The importance of consent as a constitutional principle did not end with
ratification. In a process that continues today, consent was expanded over time to
more issues, through more political structures that involved more Americans,
including those who had been excluded from the community of political
participation at the time of the Founding. Maier analyzes the process through
which consent, participation, and equality became the central tenants of the
general understanding of the Declaration of Independence and how this
understanding of the Declaration of Independence was read back into the
Constitution. 38 While acknowledging the central role of Lincoln in adapting the
Declaration of Independence to a new time and making it an "American
Scripture," a statement of core political values, Maier notes that "[t]he values he
emphasized-equality, human rights, government by consent-had in fact been
part and parcel of the Revolution . .

9."Maier

describes the process of adapting

the Declaration of Independence as a collective work of the American people, "a
continuing act of national self-definition."40
This process of continuing consent continues today. As Justice Brennan
explained some twenty-five years ago, the Constitution is a document that
should be understood in terms of "contemporary ratification." 4 1 This means that
ordinary people play a foundational role in determining government legitimacy
consistent with their constitutional duty to "ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.' 42 The American people play a structural role
in shaping and interpreting the constitution through their consent expressed
through active participation. In the same vein, Amar describes the Constitution
37. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 35, at 7. According to Kramer:

"The people" they knew could speak, and had done so. "The people" they knew had
fought a revolution, expressed dissatisfaction with the first fruits of independence, and
debated and adopted a new charter to govern themselves. Certainly the Founders were
concerned about the dangers of popular Government, some of them obsessively so. But
they were also captivated by its possibilities and in awe of its importance. Their
Constitution remained, fundamentally, an act of popular will: the people's charter, made
by the people. And, as we shall see, it was "the people themselves"-working through
and responding to their agents in the government -who were responsible for seeing that
it was properly interpreted and implemented.
Id.
38. MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE, supra note 21, at 175-208.

39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. According to Maier, "The Declaration of Independence that Lincoln left posterity, the
'charter of our liberties,' was not and could not have been his solitary creation. It was what the
American people chose to make of it, at once a legacy and a new conception, a document that
spoke both for the revolutionaries and for their descendants, who confronted issues that country's
fathers had never known or failed to resolve, binding one generation after another in a continuing
act of national self-definition." Id.
41. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433 (1986) (originally delivered as a speech at Georgetown
University on October 12, 1985).
42. U.S. CONsT., pmbl.
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as "a democratic and intergenerational project." 4 3
Elections have become the mechanism of consent. Elections establish that
consent is a foundational constitutional principle applicable to the ordinary
operation of government on an ongoing basis.
The idea that voting is an expression of consent necessary for the continuing
legitimacy of government is most apparent when the legitimacy of government is
fundamentally challenged. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court began
enforcing new federal civil rights statutes defining voting fraud as a federal
crime and, in so doing, articulated a concept of constitutive voting that treated
consent expressed through voting as the foundation of legitimate government.44
In these post-Civil War cases, the Court, in effect, mapped consent in the
elements of effective electoral participation consistent with the concept of
constitutive voting-i.e., being able to receive and mark a ballot, 4 5 putting the
ballot in the ballot box, 46 and having the election results determined by an honest
count of all of the legal votes cast. 47 As the Court explained in Ex parte
Yarbrough:
It is as essential to the successful working of this government that the
great organisms of its executive and legislative branches should be the
free choice of the people as that the original form of it should be so....
In republican governments, like ours, where political power is reposed
in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at short
intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these elections
by violence and corruption is a constant source of danger. 4 8
Ensuring that voters could cast an effective ballot was thus understood at the
time as a matter of ensuring consent in order to establish the legitimacy of the
government.
The Court returned to consent as a touchstone of legitimate government in
later cases. In the early Twentieth Century, as primary elections began to replace
private meetings of party bosses as mechanisms of candidate selection, AfricanAmericans who were registered voters were denied the right to vote in primaries
on the grounds that the political parties had the right as private associations to
43. AMAR, supra note 22, at 476.
44. See Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Contested
Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 535, 538-53 (2010) [hereinafter
Hill, Constitutive Voting]. See also Frances R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Citizen Sovereignty in Federal Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 155 (2006)
(arguing that citizens give the government legitimacy by their ongoing consent as expressed by
voting).
45. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (upholding convictions of private persons
using physical violence to prevent freed slaves from voting).
46. See Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (upholding the criminal conviction of election
judges for stuffing ballot boxes to offset the votes of freed slaves).
47. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (upholding the conviction of election
officials for refusing to receive and count votes of a freed slave eligible to vote).
48. 110U.S.at666.
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determine who participated in the selection of the party's candidates. The White
Primary cases addressed questions such as whether primaries are elections and
whether the constitutional protections accorded voters under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments applied to primary elections. 49 In the end, the Court
resolved these questions by finding consent as a core constitutional principle
establishing the legitimacy of government and treating elections as mechanisms
of consent through participation. 50 More recently, the Court in Baker v. Carr
struck down electoral districts that weighed the votes of various voters
differently. 5 1 In so doing, the Court extended the principle of consent and
affirmed its central role in defining legitimate government. Equality matters and
vote dilution matters because elections were part of the process of ensuring and
affirming the legitimacy of government. As Justice Brennan observed,
"[r]ecognition of the principle of 'one person, one vote' as a constitutional
principle redeems the promise of self-governance by affirming the essential
dignity of every citizen in the right to equal participation in the democratic
process." 52
Yet, while the Court repeatedly recognized the role of elections as a
mechanism of consent in legitimate democratic government, it did not extend the
principle of consent to campaigns and campaign finance. Individuals who choose
to make a contribution to a candidate have exercised their personal choice.
Similarly, individuals who make contributions to organizations established for

49. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that the exclusion of African-American
registered voters from a preference poll conducted by a private association that in effect
determined political party candidates violated the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby rejecting a
formalistic concept of state action); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that, because
they were statutorily required to hold primaries in order to select party nominees for inclusion on
the general election ballot, political parties were state actors and could be sued for preventing an
African-American voter from casting a ballot in a primary election); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941) (finding that a registered voter who was African-American had the right to have
his vote counted in primary election); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down a state
statute authorizing a state executive committee of a political party to limit party membership to
white voters); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (finding that a registered African-American
voter had the right to vote in a party primary).
50. See Hill, Constitutive Voting, supra note 44, at 553-75 (analyzing the White Primary
cases in terms of the role of voting as an expression of consent that establishes government
legitimacy).
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that a complaint alleging that a state
apportionment statute deprived plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action, and that the right
asserted was within reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). See also
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that Georgia's apportionment of congressional
districts so that a single congressman represented from two to three times as many voters as were
represented by each of congressmen from other Georgia districts grossly discriminated against
voters in his district); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that two legislatively
proposed plans for apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama Legislature were
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause because the apportionment was not on a population basis
and was completely lacking in rationality).
52. See Brennan, supra note 41, at 442.
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the purpose of making independent expenditures in support of a particular
candidate or groups of candidates have had the opportunity to consent to the
organizations' use of their money. But organizations that do not exist for such
clear political purposes may now use their general treasury funds for
independent expenditures as determined by the managers of the organization,
without the consent of the individuals who have become members of or
shareholders in those organizations. The issue of consent within organizations
has thus become much more important and much more difficult.
III.
ASSOCIATION AND CONSENT

In the wake of Citizens United, conceptualizing campaigns and campaign
finance without taking account of consent as a constitutional principle results in
impermissible burdens on the First Amendment associational rights of
shareholders and members. This Part discusses the attenuated development of a
jurisprudence of association. It identifies two theories of association: an entity
theory of association which treats organizations as having First Amendment
rights of association and political speech separate from the rights of their
members and shareholders, and an aggregate theory of association which treats
organization members and shareholders as having First Amendment rights
separate from those of the organization. A jurisprudence of participatory
association based on the constitutional principle of consent depends on
articulating the relationship between the entity theory and the aggregate theory
of association. This is precisely what courts have been unable or unwilling to do.
Instead of following the promising beginnings in earlier cases, the Court in
recent decades has substituted a theory of managerial primacy that limits the
scope of participation within organizations and even provides a judicial rationale
for discrimination against members and prospective members.
The core question here is whether the act of association-i.e., the act of
joining or becoming a member of an organization-means that associated
persons have no rights or lesser rights or fewer rights or different rights than they
have as individuals. The aim here is to begin to address these questions based on
the First Amendment Association Clause and in light of the constitutional
principle of consent. Importantly, while we can assume that individuals making
contributions and expenditures have consented to their own actions, we cannot
assume that an organization's members consent when that organization makes
independent expenditures using its general treasury fund without first
considering the terms of association. The link between nonparticipatory
association and compelled political speech is discussed in the next section of the
Article.
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A. Association and the FirstAmendment
Association occupies an ambiguous place in constitutional law. It is far from
clear why this should be the case. As the cases discussed later in this Part
illustrate, earlier cases treated association as an ancillary or derivative right
based on the purpose for associating. Most commonly, this was a right of free
expression. The idea that association permits people to be heard and to
participate with greater effectiveness is essential to democratic theory. What is
surprising is that the importance of association did not lead to greater interest in
the constitutional language establishing the right to associate as an important
constitutional right.
The First Amendment Association Clause reads, "Congress shall make no
law respecting. . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." 5 3 While the Association Clause
shares with the Speech Clause the introductory phrase, "Congress shall make no
law," that phrase is less significant to a jurisprudence of association than is the
language of the Association Clause itself. The question is what associational
rights might be protected under the First Amendment; it is not, at least initially,
what level of protection we might properly accord them or whether textual
literalism provides compelling support for a claim of associational absolutism.
The Association Clause focuses on the "right of the people to assemble."
This suggests an aggregate theory of association in which the people who
associate are active parties. This language does not mean that only the people
who assemble have First Amendment rights, but it does suggest that the people
who assemble cannot simply be ignored. There is some element of consent in the
act of associating.
Moreover, the Clause specifies that it protects the right of the people to
assemble peaceably in order "to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." In short, they participate in governance. They have a voice in the
operation of government and, through this voice, determine the legitimacy of
government.
The language of the Association Clause, like that of so many other
constitutional clauses, is open-textured and invites future definition. As Chief
Justice Marshall so famously said of the language of the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, "it is a Constitution we are expounding." 54 On
its face, nothing in the text of the First Amendment supports the idea that, once
people assemble, the assembly may co-opt or even silence their individual
voices. Nothing in the language of the Association Clause negates the
constitutional principle of consent. Indeed, the constitutional principle of consent
supports the ongoing effort to ensure that association is participatory and that
speech through associations is voluntary, not compelled. At the same time, there
53. U.S. CONST., amend. 1.
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
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is nothing in the text that compels any specific response to nonparticipatory
association. The problem is that courts and commentators alike seem to have
overlooked the text of the Clause entirely, and so have failed to contribute to the
usual process of construing this constitutional language. The result is an
attenuated jurisprudence of association.
The current jurisprudence of association is based in many respects on a
series of cases involving the NAACP.5 5 In these cases, the NAACP challenged
the demands by various state and local governments that local NAACP chapters
turn their membership lists over to the government in the context of such matters
as administration of a local occupational license tax 5 6 or qualifying to do
business in a state. 57 In each case, the Supreme Court held that such requests
impermissibly burdened the rights of both the NAACP chapters as organizations
and their members.5 8 For example, the Court in Bates v. City of Little Rock
overturned the convictions of two local NAACP officers for failing to turn over
documents listing the names of the organization's members and contributors as
required by a local occupational license tax statute. 59 The Court reasoned that:
Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable
assembly was considered by the Framers of the Constitution to lie at the
foundation of a government based upon the consent of an informed
citizenry-a government dedicated to the establishment of justice and
the preservation of liberty. 60
In their concurring opinion, Justice Black and Justice Douglas observed that
"freedom of assembly includes of course freedom of association; and it is
entitled to no less protection than any other First Amendment rights . . . ."61
Similarly, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, the Court held that
Alabama had no right to compel the organization to disclose the names of its
members who were neither employees nor elected leaders of the organization as
a condition of registering to do business in the state. The Court noted that
"[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court
has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the
55. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v.- City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 379 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). Thomas I. Emerson discussed these cases as evidence of his observation that "[t]he most
striking development of the past few years has been the enunciation by the Supreme Court of a
new constitutional doctrine known as 'the right of association."' Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of
Association and Freedom ofExpression, 74 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1964).
56. Bates, 361 U.S. at 517-18.
57. Patterson,357 U.S. at 451-52.
58. Bates, 361 U.S. at 527; Patterson,357 U.S. at 462-63.
59. Bates, 361 U.S. at 419.
60. Id. at 522-23.
61. Id. at 528.
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freedoms of speech and assembly." 62 Because of "the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations," the NAACP could not
be compelled to turn over its membership lists. 63
The NAACP cases provide a promising contribution to a jurisprudence of
association. In these cases, the Court recognized that the right to freedom of
association is a First Amendment right and did not treat this right as purely
derivative of other constitutionally-protected rights. 6 4 The Court considered the
rights of organizations and the rights of members of organizations. At the same
time, these important cases did not address the issue of the rights of members
who have interests at least partially adverse to those of the organization, as there
was no factual predicate for such a claim.
The Supreme Court considered the right of association in campaign finance
law in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley.65 In that case, an
unincorporated association formed to oppose a ballot measure intended to
require rent control in Berkeley, California sought injunctive relief against a
Berkeley city ordinance that prohibited individuals from contributing more than
$250 to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to a
popular vote. 66 The association collected some 1300 contributions, nine of which
exceeded the amount an individual was permitted to contribute to the
organization. 67 This ordinance placed no limit on the amount an individual could
spend directly on supporting or opposing a ballot measure. 6 8 The case thus
involved the rights of the contributors to associate and speak by making
contributions to the organization, and the right of the organization to spend the
contributions to oppose the ballot measure. In the ensuing litigation, the
California Supreme Court upheld the Berkeley city ordinance because it found
the state had a compelling interest in avoiding corruption. 69
On appeal, the Supreme Court struck down the city ordinance based in part
on a determination that the city could show no compelling government interest
that could justify limiting the rights of association and speech in the context of
ballot measures. 70 The Court held that the city ordinance "imposes a significant
62. Patterson,357 U.S. at 460.
63. Id. at 462.
64. The majority in Patterson stated that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as
this Court has more than once recognized by remaking upon the close nexus between the freedoms
of speech and assembly." 357 U.S. at 460. According to Emerson, the Court in Patterson "initially
treated freedom of association as derivative from the first amendment rights to freedom of speech
and assembly, and as ancillary to them" but that, as it continued its analysis, the majority "elevated
freedom of association to an independent right." Emerson, supra note 55, at 2
65. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
66. Id. at 292-93.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 614 P.2d 742 (1980).
70. Id. at 299 ("Whatever may be the state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and
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restraint on the freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish
to express their views through committees."7 1 The majority in Citizens Against
Rent Control based its decision, in part, on the notion that the First Amendment
right of association encompassed the concept that individuals could not be made
subject to special limitations if they acted with others in an association. The
majority observed:
[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding together to
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political
process.... Its value is that by collective effort individuals can make
their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or
lost. 72
As in the NAACP cases, the Court looked at association as a means of
amplifying the voices of the individuals who associate. In this case, however, the
Court also focused more directly on the role of contributors as having actively
engaged in an act of association that is protected under the First Amendment.7 3
The Court thus found that the city could not impose a limit on individuals who
associated with others in the organization when it imposed no limit on
individuals who spoke as individuals:
There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet
illegal if performed in concert with others, but political expression is
not one of them. To place a Spartan limit-or indeed any limit-on
individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot
measure, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a
restraint on the right of association. [The ordinance] does not seek to
mute the voice of one individual, and it cannot be allowed to hobble the

limiting contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate's committees there is no
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure."). The
Court went on to reject the city's claim that the limit on contributions to the organization was
necessary to ensure that voters had adequate information about the source of the organization's
funds. Id. at 298 ("[Tlhe city of Berkeley argues that § 602 is necessary as a prophylactic measure
to make known the identity of supporters and opponents of ballot measures."). The Court
acknowledged that "[i]t is true that when individuals or corporations speak through committees,
they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true identity of the source." Id. In
this case, however, the Court held that such concerns were allayed by the disclosure requirements
imposed by other sections of the city ordinance, which required publication of lists of contributors
in advance of voting. Id.
71. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299. Professor Tribe found this element of the
Court's reasoning a significant contribution to the jurisprudence of association, stating that "[n]ot
until Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley did the Court suggest that individuals acting in
concert have an associational right to be as free to pursue lawful aims as they would if the same
individuals pursued the same aims acting
CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 1012 (2d ed. 1988).

separately."

LAURENCE H. TRIBE,

AMERICAN

72. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294-95.
73. See id. at 295-96 (addressing freedom of association); id. at 299 (addressing freedom of
speech).
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collective expressions of a group. 74
However, it is important to note that there was no question in this case that the
organization was using the contributions as the contributors had intended.
Whether the organization is conceptualized as an entity or as an aggregate, there
was no issue of compelled political speech arising from the operation of the
organization.
The Court concluded by considering the relation between the right of
association and the right to freedom of expression. The Court reasoned:
A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed exclusively
in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two
rights overlap and blend; to limit the right of association places an
impermissible restraint on the right of expression. The restraint imposed
by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn on
individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both
the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First
Amendment.75
These cases contribute to the recognition of association as an autonomous right
under the First Amendment. While these cases contain some elements of both
entity and aggregate theories of association, they were not based on fact patterns
involving members or contributors with interests inconsistent with those of the
organization. This fact pattern emerged in a series of cases involving union
political activities funded by their members.
B. Elements of an Aggregate Theory ofAssociation
The issue of consent in cases where members' interests were at least
partially adverse to the interest of the organization (as defined by the
organization managers) arose in the context of politically active labor unions
during and after World War 11.76 In each case, the union and its officers
challenged their convictions under a section of the Corrupt Practices Act, which
banned unions from making any contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election to any political office. These cases turned on issues relating to the
use of union funds derived from membership dues for political activities. The
rights of members to participate in the decision to fund particular political
activities arose in different contexts and thus produced somewhat different
reasoning.
In United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.LO), for

74. Id. at 296.
75. Id. at 300.
76. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v.
Int'l United Auto, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (U.A.W.), 352 U.S.
567 (1957); United States v. Congress of Indus. Organizations (C.I.O.), 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
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example, union representatives challenged the constitutionality of a section of
the Corrupt Practices Act that banned unions from making any contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election to any political office.7 7 Several
union representatives had been convicted under the Act for using union funds to
endorse candidates for public office in the union's regular periodical distributed
to its members.7 8 The Court reversed their convictions, finding that the Act did
not reach this kind of expenditure. 79 Notably, it found that members knew that
the union published a periodical that endorsed candidates and that the union
endorsements were based on the union leaders' determinations that those
candidates endorsed by the union in its periodical supported policies favorable to
the union and its members. 80 As such, the Court found that "[i]t is unduly
stretching language to say that the members or stockholders are unwilling
participants in such normal organizational activities, including the advocacy
thereby of governmental policies affecting their interests, and the support
thereby of candidates thought to be favorable to their interests." 8 1
The Court reached a different conclusion in United States v. International
United Auto, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UA. W), in which union officials challenged the constitutionality of their
indictment under the Act for using union funds derived from member dues to
finance television ads aimed at convincing the general public to vote for
particular candidates in the 1954 elections. 82 The majority distinguished this
case from C.I.0. on the grounds that the expenditure at issue here was directed at
the public while the C.I.O.'s expenditure was directed at its own members. 83 The
majority then rejected the government's claims that this case raised
constitutional issue of speech and association under the First Amendment. 84
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Court should have addressed
the constitutional issues, particularly the right of the union as an entity to engage
in political speech and the right of voters to hear the viewpoints of all speakers. 85
Despite its focus on the rights of the union as a speaker, Douglas's dissent did at
least acknowledge that members who did not want their dues used to support the
entity's political message should be considered. 86 Describing this issue as "a
question that concerns the internal management of union affairs," 87 the dissent

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

CLO., 335 U.S. at 107-09.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 123.
Id.
UA. W., 352 U.S. at 584-85.
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589-93.
Id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 596 (Douglas. J, dissenting).
Id. (Douglas, J, dissenting).

qngddvihlP~kmimimof)Ntld.Neek

nb1itvrs&SidiabChffigv

2011]

NONPARTICIPA TORY ASSOCIATION

569

acknowledged that "[p]erhaps minority rights need some protection."" The
dissent emphasized the importance of finding a way of offering this protection
without burdening the right of the union, which the dissent treated as the
equivalent of the majority of its members, to engage in political speech. 89 The
dissent suggested that this could be done "by permitting the minority to
withdraw their funds from that activity." 9 0 The fundamental principle articulated
by the dissent was that "First Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all
persons and groups in this country." 9 1 While Douglas's dissent did not address
association or consent as constitutional principles, it did explore some of the
difficulties of finding an appropriate balance between the entity and aggregate
theories of association.
The last of these union cases, Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United
States,92 also involved a union political fund created using the contributions of
both union members and nonmembers working under collective bargaining
agreements negotiated by the union. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan
treated the question of whether the contributions to the political fund were
voluntary as the central question in the case. 93 The Court interpreted the relevant
legislative history as establishing that the statute did not apply to voluntary
contributions used for political expenditures. 9 4 The Court held that union
officials can control the use of the fund but that solicitation of contributions from
union members by union officials "must be conducted under circumstances
plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose and that those
solicited may decline to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or
any other reprisal within the union's institutional power." 95 The Court defined
"the test of voluntariness" as "whether the contributions solicited for political
use are knowing free-choice donations." 9 6 The Court observed that "[t]he
dominant concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to
protect the dissenting stockholder or union member." 9 7 The voluntary quality of
the donations also meant that the union was not violating what the Court
identified as Congress' concern about the use of aggregate wealth in election
campaigns. The Court determined that "the aggregate wealth it plainly had in
mind was the general union treasury-not the funds donated by union members

88. Id. (Douglas, J, dissenting).
89. Id. at 597. (Douglas, J, dissenting).
90. Id. at 597 n.1 (Douglas, J, dissenting). Douglas observed that this was the common
practice in England. Id.
91. Id. at 597. (Douglas, J, dissenting).
92. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
93. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 391-401 (1972)
(discussing evidence relating to whether the contributions were voluntary).
94. Id. at 408-409.
95. Id. at 414.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 414-15.
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of their own free and knowing choice." 9 8 Although the Court did not address
association directly, its emphasis on voluntary contributions is consistent with
the constitutional principle of consent.
What the Court did not address in any of these union cases was the question
of member participation in determining how the voluntary contributions should
be used. In Pipefitters, for example, union members could choose to contribute
to the political fund, but had no role in determining how the money in the
political fund would be spent.
Taken together, these three early union cases recognized that members'
interest in elections could be adverse to the interests of the organization that they
joined for other reasons. While these cases by no means developed a
jurisprudence that integrates the aggregate and entity theories of association,
they did focus on some of the very difficult issues in crafting a jurisprudence of
participatory association that does not result in compelled political speech.
C. Expressive Association as an Entity Theory ofNonparticipatory
Association and CompelledPoliticalSpeech
Subsequent cases addressing association centered on the key questions of
who could join an organization and who would decide this matter. The authority
to control who joined an organization was argued in terms of the identity of the
organization as an entity engaged in expressive activities. This argument posited
that the composition of the organization was an integral part of the
organization's expressive activity and thus protected under the First Amendment
right of association. Even those members who shared the organization's beliefs
and supported its activities could be declared ineligible for membership based on
some aspect of the prospective members' identities, such as race, gender, or
national origin. In light of the subsequent history of expressive association in
providing a First Amendment rationale for discrimination,9 it is useful to
remember that the initial cases involved claims that business associationsspecifically, the Chamber of Commerceloo and the Rotary Club 0 1-had no
constitutional right to deny membership to women on the basis of gender. In
both these cases, local chapters admitted women to full membership contrary to
the stated policies of the organizations, and the managers of the national or
international organizations revoked or threatened to revoke the charters of the
local chapters.10 2 In each case, the managers of the national or international
organizations claimed that they had a First Amendment right to determine who
98. Id. at 416.
99. See the discussion of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), infra notes
115-123 and accompanying text.
100. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
101. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
102. Id. at 541-42; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614-15.
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could join their organizations, and that this right of association protected them
from any requirement that they comply with anti-discrimination statutes if doing
so was, in their judgment, inconsistent with the identity of the organization. 103
In both cases, the Court rejected the national or international business
associations' claims that they could discriminate against women whom the local
chapters had found qualified for membership.1 04 In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, described freedom of expressive
association as "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion."1 0 5 He focused on the rights of
individuals to associate, stating that "[t]he Constitution guarantees freedom of
association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual
liberties." 106 As such, "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to
petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage
in a group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 10 7
Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of
Duarte, the Court rejected the notion that the business association had a First
Amendment right to exclude women on the basis of gender. In that case, Rotary
International argued that a California statute prohibiting discrimination against
women violated the organization's right of expressive association under the First
Amendment.10 8 The Court agreed that Rotary was an expressive association:
although the Rotary Clubs do not take political positions, they do engage in
"service activities that are protected by the First Amendment." 1 09 However, the
Court found that this characterization was not in itself determinative. The Court
looked at the organization, the organization's activities, and the prospective
members and found that "the evidence fail[ed] to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members'
ability to carry out their various purposes." 1 10 Both the organization and its
prospective members were treated as having First Amendment rights."' The
issue of what roles and rights women and other members might have once they
had been admitted to membership was not before the Court.

103. Bd ofDirs. ofRotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 537; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 608-09.
104. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 548-49 (finding that Rotary's expressive
identity was not undermined by admission of women to full membership); Roberts, 468 U.S. at
623 (observing that the right of expressive association is not absolute). The Court in Rotary Int'l
based its First Amendment reasoning on its reasoning in Roberts. Id. at 544-45.
105. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 622.
108. See Bd. ofDirs. ofRotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 543-49.
109. Id. at 548.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 548-49.
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Both Roberts and Rotary involved the rights of women and the enforcement
of state statutes prohibiting discrimination based on gender. In Roberts, the
Court rejected arguments that the First Amendment protects the right to
discriminate on the basis of gender as part of the right of association. The
Roberts Court held that expressive association is not an absolute right but is
properly balanced against a compelling state interest in preventing
discrimination. 112 The Court also relied on a balancing approach in Rotary.113 In
both cases, the Court took a step toward crafting a jurisprudence of participatory
association that rejects constitutionally impermissible discrimination.
This step forward was rejected and reversed in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale.1 14 The issue in that case was whether a New Jersey anti-discrimination
statute required that an Eagle Scout who was openly gay be permitted to serve as
a scoutmaster.1 1 5 The Boy Scouts claimed that requiring the organization to
allow James Dale to serve as a scoutmaster would violate its First Amendment
right of expressive association. 116 The Court's problematic factual predicates
relating primarily to the Boy Scouts' policies and unprecedented reliance on
unsupported assertions in the organization's briefs were the focus of vigorous
dissents1 17 and intensely critical analysis,1 18 but they are not the central point
here. The point here is that the Court refused to inquire into the internal
operations of the organization and concluded that "the First Amendment simply
does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order for
the group's policy to be 'expressive association."' 1 9 This formulation is at best
misleading. The issue in the case was whether treating an organization as

112. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-29.
113. Bd. ofDirs. ofRotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 549.
114. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
115. Id. at 645.
116. See id. at 651 ("The Boy Scouts asserts that it 'teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not
morally straight,' Brief for Petitioners 39, and that it does 'not want to promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,' Reply Brief for Petitioners 5.").
117. In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed concern about the implications of both the
result and reasoning in Dale for the jurisprudence of association. Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("If this Court were to defer to whatever position an organization is prepared to assert in its briefs,
there would be no way to mark the proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to
associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive
private discrimination, on the other hand. Shielding a litigant's claim from judicial scrutiny would,
in turn, render civil rights legislation a nullity, and turn this important constitutional right into a
farce. Accordingly, the Court's prescription of total deference will not do.").
118. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest ofAssociations, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 595 (2001) (criticizing the Court's reliance on statements by managers in the
briefs to determine organizational policies and arguing that preventing discrimination against gays
is a compelling government interest permitting regulation of the Boy Scouts to prevent
impermissible discrimination); Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the FirstPerson Plural:Expressive
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1483 (2001) (criticizing the Court's
focus solely on entities and managers and urging greater focus on members and their roles in
associations).
119. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
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engaged in expressive activity means that the organization and its managers may
intentionally violate a statute that prohibits discrimination against persons
otherwise qualified for a role in the organization. As an Eagle Scout, Dale was
certainly qualified for a role in the organization. The case is significant because
the Court determined that invocations of the right of expressive association
provide absolute discretion to organization managers.1 2 0 In holding that the Boy
Scouts could exclude an Eagle Scout based on his sexual orientation, the Court
in Dale interpreted the First Amendment right of association as overriding other
constitutional values, such as equal protection, even when this meant permitting
otherwise impermissible discrimination. 12 1 In so holding, the Court rejected and
reversed the balancing approach at the heart of Roberts and Rotary.12 2 It also
rejected any effort to craft a jurisprudence of participatory association, and,
instead, chose to adopt an entity theory of association and to link the entity
theory to absolute discretion by organization managers. This is a fully developed
jurisprudence of nonparticipatory association linked with First Amendment
absolutism that gives no consideration to any other constitutional principle or
requirement.
The Court quickly extended its reasoning in Dale to political parties in
CaliforniaDemocratic Party v. Jones, which was decided two days later. 12 3 in
Jones, the Court held that a state statute establishing a blanket primary system
124
violated political parties' First Amendment right of expressive association.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that "we have continually stressed
that when States regulate parties' internal processes they must act within limits
imposed by the Constitution." 1 25 Justice Scalia concluded, citing Roberts, that "a
corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate." 1 2 6 Thus, political
parties could not be compelled to permit voters who were not party members to
select the party's candidate in the general election. 127 The point here is not the
relative merits of a blanket primary compared with a closed primary but rather
the absolute authority of party managers to decide this matter. The Court thus
invoked the First Amendment in the service of nonparticipatory association and
managerial control.
Participatory association and consensual political speech are the benchmark
120.Id.
121. Id. at 657-59.
122. Id. at 656-57.
123. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
124. Id. at 572-73.
125. Id. at 573. This is an astoundingly willful recasting of the legacy of the White Primary
cases. See Hill, Constitutive Voting, supra note 44, at 616-19 (discussing how the Court "limited
the White Primary cases to situations in which 'a State prescribes an election process that gives a
special role to political parties"').
126. Jones, 530 U.S. at 574. Justice Scalia then claimed that "[in no area is the political
association's right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee." Id. at
575.
127. Id. at 573-75.
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of a constitutional jurisprudence of association. Development of this
jurisprudence depends on recognizing the importance of both the aggregate
theory and the entity theory of association. By adopting a concept of expressive
association, the Supreme Court has abandoned the aggregate theory and, in so
doing, has ignored the central importance of the constitutional principle of
consent. Citizens United extends the harm attendant upon the rejection of
consent as a constitutional principle applicable to campaign finance
jurisprudence. As the next Part suggests, this was an avoidable error.
IV.
ELEMENTS OF PARTICIPATORY ASSOCIATION AND COMPELLED POLITICAL

SPEECH: THE LAW BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED

Participatory association is the foundation of voluntary political speech for
members of organizations. Yet neither courts nor commentators have focused on
participation inside organizations as a central element of the jurisprudence of
association. In his seminal article on association, Thomas Emerson observed that
"the rights of individual members and minority groups within these centers of
private power have come to be a matter of growing concern," but he did not
develop this insight.12 8 While the courts have neither expressly denied the right
of participation nor expressly defended the resulting compulsion with respect to
political speech, they have failed to develop a jurisprudence of association that
includes consent as a core constitutional value. The result of this failure is
compelled political speech. This is an avoidable wrong turn in the development
of a jurisprudence of association. This Part analyzes elements of participation
and consent in certain campaign finance cases decided before Citizens United
Prior to Citizens United, these elements of consent had by no means cohered into
a fully developed jurisprudence of participatory association that protected
members and shareholders from compelled political speech. As is discussed in
the following section, Citizens United interdicted the development of a
jurisprudence of participatory association without compelled political speech and
made developing such a jurisprudence of association much more difficult.
A. Austin and MCFL: Two Approaches to ParticipatoryAssociation in
Campaign FinanceJurisprudencebefore Citizens United
Before it decided Citizens United, the Court decided two cases that had
addressed elements of participatory association, albeit somewhat obliquely. In
Citizens United, the Court devoted itself to overruling one of these cases, Austin

128. Emerson, supra note 55, at 1. Emerson did include among his four contexts in which
difficult questions of freedom of association arise "rights of individual members or minority
groups vis-a-vis the organization to which they belong." Id. at 3.
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v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.12 9 The other case, Federal Election
Comission (FEC) v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL),13 o was not
expressly overruled, but little is left of either its holding or its reasoning. These
two cases provide two different theories of association and two different
approaches to using entity structure to provide at least some limited element of
participation within the organization. Neither embraces a fully-developed
concept of an association as an aggregate, neither incorporates consent as a
constitutional principle, and neither sets forth a fully specified concept of
participatory association. Yet each provides potential building blocks for an
approach to participatory association that treats consent as a constitutional
principle.
These two cases provide a useful means of exploring participation in
expressive associations both because of their similarities and because of their
differences. Both Austin and MCFL involved tax-exempt entities. Austin
involved a state chamber of commerce, 13 1 while MCFL involved a section
501(c)(4) organizationl 32 dedicated to preventing abortion. Austin involved a
multi-issue group that attracted members interested in business and in discussing
business issues with other people involved in business. 133 MCFL involved a
single-issue group of people who shared a common opposition to abortion. 134
The chamber of commerce in Austin operated a well-financed PAC.13 5 MCFL
had established a PAC six years before the Supreme Court decided the case, 13 6
but it nevertheless argued that it should not be required to finance its
independent expenditures through the PAC because MCFL itself received
contributions solely from individuals. Juxtaposing the two cases provides a
framework for thinking about the complex issue of participation in various types

129. Austin v. Mich Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989).
130. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
131. A chamber of commerce is exempt from federal income taxation under § 501(c)(6) of
the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2006). While dues paid to a chamber of
commerce may be deductible under § 162(a) as a trade or business expense, any dues used for
lobbying or for other political activity are not deductible. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a), (e). The organization
must either notify members of the share of dues that are not deductible each taxable year or pay a
proxy tax. For a detailed analysis of § 501(c)(6) organizations, see FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS
M. MANcINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

14.01-.06 (2009).

132. MCFL is exempt from federal income taxation under 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(4) (2006).
Contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Lobbying is an exempt activity
for a section 501(c)(4) organization and may be the organization's sole activity. A section
501(c)(4) organization may expressly support or oppose the election of a candidate for public
office, but such activity may not be the organization's primary activity. For a detailed analysis of
13.01-.07.
section 501 (c)(4) organizations, see HILL & MANCINO, supra note 131, at
133. Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
134. MCFL, 79 U.S. at 260-62.
135. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 676 n.7.
136. MCFL had established a PAC in 1980. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 255 n.8. The Court took the
position that this fact did not alter its conclusion that the PAC requirement impermissibly burdened
political speech by organizations like MCFL. Id.
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of organizations.1 37
MCFL was the first case to challenge the prohibition on independent
expenditures by corporations and the requirement that any such expenditures be
made through a PAC. The case arose under section 441b of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), the same section at issue in Citizens United. MCFL had
made several expenditures from its general treasury related to the publication of
a "Special Edition" of the organization's newsletter that contained a voter guide
highlighting candidates' views on abortion. 138 At issue was whether MCFL
should have the right under the First Amendment to use its general treasury
funds to finance the Special Edition rather than having to use a PAC-i.e.,
whether section 441b was unconstitutional as applied to that organization. 139
The government argued that FECA section 441b was necessary to ensure that
organizations, including MCFL, did not use members' contributions to finance
political speech that the members had not authorized. 14 0
The Court rejected MCFL's claim that the Special Edition was not an
independent expenditure because it did not constitute express advocacy.141
However, the Court agreed that the statute was nevertheless unconstitutional as
applied to MCFL. 142 The Court emphasized that its opinion applied only to
organizations like MCFL and that its opinion did not strike down the PAC
requirement generally. The Court made it clear that it regarded the PAC
requirement as a mechanism for ensuring that political contributions reflect the
political preferences of the contributors, 143 and emphasized the importance of
the PAC requirements for union members or corporation shareholders protection
from compelled political speech. 144 Nonetheless, because it found that an
137. See infra Part VI for a discussion of potential responses for single-issue nonprofits,
complex nonprofits, and taxable business corporations.
138. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243-44. The Special Edition was a voter guide that identified prolife candidates and urged readers to vote for them. Id. It was distributed to approximately 100,000
persons, a number that far exceeded the approximately 3,000 recipients of regular editions of the
newsletter. Id. at 244.
139. Id. at 241.
140. Id. at 258-59 (citing Pipefitters and U.A. W. on the importance of ensuring that
contributions for political speech are voluntary). See supraPart III for a discussion of these cases.
141. Id. at 248-50.
142. Id. at 263.
143. Id. at 258.
144. Id. at 260 ("The Commission next argues in support of § 441b that it prevents an
organization from using an individual's money for purposes that the individual may not support.
We acknowledged the legitimacy of this concern as to the dissenting stockholder and union
member in National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S., at 208, 103 S.Ct., at 559, and in
Pipefitters, 407 U.S., at 414-415, 92 S.Ct., at 2264. But such persons, as noted, contribute
investment funds or union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily authorize the use of their
money for political ends. Furthermore, because such individuals depend on the organization for
income or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhappiness with the use of their money
can be redressed simply by leaving the corporation or the union. It was thus wholly reasonable for
Congress to require the establishment of a separate political fund to which persons can make
voluntary contributions.")
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organization like MCFL posed no danger of political corruption, the government
could not restrict its independent expenditures to those made through a PAC. 14 5
In MCFL, the Court formulated a means of protecting the constitutional
importance of member consent without requiring the use of a PAC. This
approach was based on the specific structure of MCFL as a single-issue
organization that made its purpose and its activities in support of that purpose
clear to all who might contemplate contributing to the organization. 14 6 The Court
located consent at the time the member chose to contribute to the organization,
noting that "[i]ndividuals who contribute to appellee are fully aware of its
political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those
purposes." 1 47
While the Court recognized that consent at the time of contribution is not
the same as ongoing participation in determining how that contribution will be
used by the organization, it found the initial consent was still meaningful. 14 8 The
Court reasoned that:
It is true that a contributor may not be aware of the exact use to which
her or her money ultimately may be put, or the specific candidate that it
may be used to support. However, individuals contribute to a political
organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more
effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own
personal direction. Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at
least some degree of delegation of authority to use such funds in a
manner that best serves the shared political purposes of the organization
and contributor. 149
The Court also suggested that contributors could earmark their contributions for
particular uses. 150 The Court noted that this approach might be particularly
useful when a contributor wanted to support a cause but did not wish to do so
through support of candidates for public office. 15 1
This theory of locating consent in association at the point of making the
contribution was expressed by the Court in its three-prong test for determining
what type of organization could use its general treasury funds to finance

145. See id. at 259. The Court distinguished FECA section 441b from the state statute at issue
in FirstNat'l Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which the Court in MCFL described
as involving "a complete foreclosure of any opportunity for political speech." Id. at 259 n.12.
146. Id. at 260-62.
147. Id. at 260-61.
148. Id. at 261.
149. Id.
150. Id. ("In addition, an individual desiring more direct control over the use of his or her
money can simply earmark the contribution for a specific purpose, an option whose availability
does not depend on the applicability of § 441b."). For further consideration of this option, see infra
Part VI.
151. For further discussion, see infra Part V.
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independent expenditures in election campaigns.1 52 First, prospective members
must know that the organization focused exclusively on one issue. 15 3 Second,
none of the contributors could have a claim on the organization's assets or
earnings in order to ensure that the cost of exit are relatively low. 154 Third, the
organization must accept no contributions from business corporations, so that the
organization was not a conduit for the use of power in the marketplace to acquire
political power. 155 This test was subsequently incorporated into FEC regulations
under FECA section 441 b as the "qualified nonprofit corporation" test. 156
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Stevens, dissented in part and concurred in part. Their dissent rested in
substantial part on the argument that the majority's three-part test would not
protect the political speech rights of "individuals who pay money into a
corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates for public
office."1 5 7 The dissent pointed out that in FEC v. National Right To Work
Committee (NRWC),'15 the Court had upheld the limitations on PAC
solicitations in the case of a "corporation ... not unlike MCFL-a nonprofit
corporation without capital stock, formed to educate the public on an issue of
perceived public importance." 15 9 The dissent rejected the majority's distinction
between MCFL's use of general treasury funds for independent expenditures and
NRWC's use of general treasury funds for contributions to candidates, 160
remarking that "[t]he distinction between contributions and independent
expenditures is not a line separating black from white."1 6 1
While MCFL was a single-issue organization that made its views and its
political activities very clear, the Chamber of Commerce in Austin was a large,
multipurpose organization with some 8,000 members, three-fourths of which
were taxable corporations. 162 It controlled a PAC with a track record of
successful fund raising. 163 Nevertheless, the Chamber argued that it should be
able to use its general treasury funds for independent expenditures to support or
oppose candidates in elections for state office, notwithstanding a Michigan state
law that only permitted corporate independent expenditures made through a
PAC. 16 4 The Chamber did not qualify as an MCFL-type organization that could
152. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264.
153. Id. at 264.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See 11 C.F. R. § 114.10 (2010).
157. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing the union PAC cases).
158. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'1 Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
159. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 270.
161. Id. at 270.
162. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1989).
163. Id at 658.
164. Id. at 654-56. The Court observed that permitting the Chamber to use its general
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use its general treasury funds for independent expenditures.16 5
The Court in Austin upheld the Michigan statute's PAC requirement.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall reasoned that "[b]ecause persons
contributing to [PACs] understand that their money will be used solely for
political purposes, the speech generated accurately reflects contributors' support
for the corporation's political views." 1 6 6 By contrast, "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregates of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation with the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas" justified the restriction on
independent expenditures from general treasury funds.1 6 7 The Court found that
both contributions to candidates and independent expenditures pose a danger of
this kind of corruption. 16 8
The Court pointed specifically to the impossibility of members having
knowledge of the Chamber's likely political positions due to the Chamber's
"more varied purposes." 1 69 The Court also noted that the Chamber's
"educational activities are not expressly tied to political goals."' 70 Because
members may want to participate in the educational activities without supporting
the Chamber's political agenda, they may be reluctant to leave the Chamber. 17 1
Although the majority did not directly address consent or the nature of an
association as either an entity or an aggregate, it did indicate that the
opportunities for consent in MCFL did not exist in Austin. 172
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Austin underscored the element of
participation and consent at the heart of his majority opinion in MCFL and
responded to the assault on these principles in Justice Kennedy's dissent. Justice
Brennan agreed with the dissents, discussed in more detail below, that political
speech is at the core of the First Amendment. 17 3 He argued, however, that the
First Amendment protected the association and political speech rights of the
members and shareholders of the corporations, not just the rights of the
entities. 174 He found that "just as speech interests are at their zenith in [the area
treasury funds would enable it to operate as a conduit for corporate money in a way that the
Chamber's controlled PAC could not, because the PAC could not accept contributions from
corporate members or nonmembers general treasury funds. Id. at 664.
165. Id. at 661-65.
166. Id. at 660-61.
167. Id. 659-60.
168. Id. at 660.
169. Id. at 662.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 663.
172. See id. at 662-63 ("In reaching th[e] conclusion [in MCFL], we enumerated three
characteristics of the corporation that were 'essential' to our holding.... Because the Chamber
does not share these crucial features, the Constitution does not require that it be exempted from the
generally applicable provisions of [the Michigan statute].").
173. See id at 669-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
174. See id. at 670-78 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of political speech], so too are the interests of unwilling Chamber members and
corporate shareholders forced to subsidize that speech." 17 5 He insisted that the
Michigan statute should be understood as "preventing both the Chamber and
other business corporations from using the funds of other persons for purposes
that those persons may not support."1 76 He also noted that the PAC requirement
"protects dissenting shareholders of business corporations that are members of
the Chamber to the extent that such shareholders oppose the use of their money,
paid as dues to the Chamber out of general corporate treasury funds, for political
campaigns." 17 7 In effect, Justice Brennan set forth the beginning of a
jurisprudence of participatory association and consensual political speech for
complex, multipurpose nonprofit organizations.
Even this modest beginning was categorically rejected in the dissents. These
dissenting opinions, with their unnuanced rejections of participatory association
and consensual political speech within organizations, put in sharp relief the
difficulty of developing a jurisprudence of association based on consent. They
underscore the consequences of embracing an entity theory of association
without also considering the interests at stake in an aggregate theory of
association. These dissents are precursors of the positions taken by the majority
in Citizens United.
In their dissents, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy took exception to
the idea of member consent as a compelling government interest. Justice Scalia
dismissed Justice Brennan's concurring opinion as an effort to present the
Michigan statute as "a paternalistic measure to protect the corporate shareholders
of America." 17 8 Writing about the relationship between a business corporation
and its shareholders, Justice Scalia set forth his own theory of association:
A person becomes a member of that form of association known as a forprofit corporation in order to pursue economic objectives, i.e., to make
money .... Thus, in joining such an association, the shareholder knows
that management may take any action that is ultimately in accord with
what the majority (or a specified supermajority) of the shareholders
wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit. That is the
deal. 179
Justice Scalia rejected any idea that a shareholder should have any voice in the
event that the corporation takes actions that the shareholder finds
"uncongenial." 80
Justice Scalia offers no description of "the deal" that contributors or
175. Id. at 677 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 672 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 673 (Brennan, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 685-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan rejected this analysis in his concurring
opinion. Id. at 676 n.8.
180. Id at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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members or supporters make when they join a nonprofit organization. Rejecting
any distinction between business corporations and nonprofit corporations, Justice
Scalia framed the issue of members of nonprofit corporations as follows:
Would it be any more upsetting to a shareholder of General Motors that
it endorsed the election of Henry Wallace (to stay comfortably in the
past) than it would be to a member of the American Civil Liberties
Union that it endorsed the election of George Wallace? I should think
much less so. Yet in the one case as in the other, the only protection
against association-induced trauma is the will of the majority and, in the
last analysis, withdrawal from membership.' 8 1
The casual reference to "association-induced trauma" underscores Justice
Scalia's refusal to consider the speech interests of organization members. While
Justice Scalia concludes his dissent with the observation that "[t]he premise of
our system is that there is no such thing as too much speech,"1 82 this observation
apparently does not apply to speech by organization members or corporate
shareholders.
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy denounced distinctions between the
First Amendment rights accorded individuals and corporations,1 8 3 as well as
distinctions among the rights accorded to different types of corporations.1 84
Dismissing the PAC option as a "secondhand endorsement structure," 1 85 Justice
Kennedy observed that speaking through a PAC resulted in "diffusion of the
corporate message."1 86 He expressed greater concern about such diffusion of the
corporation message than about the rights of corporate shareholders or
association members.
Justice Kennedy seems content to relegate association members to the role
of listeners to the speech of their own associations. After reciting a list of
prominent exempt entities that had filed amicus briefs in support of the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, Justice Kennedy concluded:
I reject any argument based on the idea that these groups and their
views are not of importance and value to the self-fulfillment and selfexpression of their members, and to the rich public dialogue that must
be the mark of any free society. To suggest otherwise is contrary to the
181. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 699-700 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("[Tihe Act discriminates on the basis of the
speaker's identity. Under the Michigan law, any person or group other than a corporation may
engage in political debate over candidate elections; but corporations, even nonprofit corporations
that have unique views of vital importance to the electorate, must remain mute. Our precedents
condemn this censorship."). Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's dissent.
184. Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The protection afforded core political speech is not
diminished because the speaker is a nonprofit corporation. Even in the case of a for-profit
corporation, we have upheld the right to speak on ballot issues.")
185. Id. at 708 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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American political experience and our own judicial knowledge.1 87
What "judicial knowledge" Justice Kennedy was invoking remains unexplained.
He went on to state that "[t]o the extent that members disagree with a nonprofit
corporation's policies, they can seek change from within, withhold financial
support, cease to associate with the group, form a rival group of their own."1 8 8
He expressly rejected claims that protecting dissident members was a sufficient
compelling state interest to support the PAC requirement. 189 Justice Kennedy
concluded that "[a]llowing government to use the excuse of protecting
shareholder rights to stifle the speech of private, voluntary organizations
undermines the First Amendment." 1 90 He did not consider the possibility that
protecting association members' rights is part of the First Amendment and not
simply an impermissible burden on the rights of associations.
What is certain in Austin is that Justice Kennedy articulated a jurisprudence
of nonparticipatory association. Left unclear is how nonparticipatory association
can be reconciled with the idea of "one person, one vote," the idea of
representation, or the idea of government accountability to the people. In sum,
Justice Kennedy removed consent from the Constitution and does not appear to
understand the harm that result from his reasoning.
Both MCFL and Austin linked nonparticipatory association to compelled
political speech. In MCFL, the Court found that the transparency of a singleissue advocacy association provided sufficient information about the
organization's political activities to infer consent from the individual's decision
to contribute. In Austin, the Court found that a large, multipurpose organization
could not assume consent, but that the use of a PAC permitted members and
contributors to consent to political expenditures. The dissents rejected any
participation in organizations and ignored the relationship between
nonparticipatory association and compelled political speech.
B. Seeking Limits on CompelledPoliticalSpeech
Individuals have broad but not absolute rights of political speech under the
First Amendment. Once an individual affiliates with an association, the situation
becomes far more complex and problematic. The existing jurisprudence of
compelled speech offers no ready solutions to the constitutional problem of
compelled speech arising from nonparticipatory association. Nevertheless, the
cases that reject the right of the government to compel speech are important

187. Id. (Kennedy J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 710 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978) as "noting 'crucial distinction' between union members and
shareholders"). Justice Kennedy rejected the relevance of such compelled speech cases as Abood v.
DetroitFirst BoardofEducation, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), noting crisply that "[olne need not become
a member of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce ... in order to earn a living." Id. at 710.
190. Id. (Kennedy J., dissenting).
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because they establish that a core element of the First Amendment right to free
speech is not only the right to speak freely and voluntarily, but the right to be
free from efforts to compel persons to speak or not to speak. 19 1 As discussed
above, the fundamental problem is the attenuated development of a
jurisprudence of association. 19 2 The core question is whether or not the act of
association amplifies the voices of the people who constitute the association. The
jurisprudence of association offers no clear answer to this question. The Court
has decided a number of cases involving claims by union memberS 19 3 or by
nonmembers in agency shops 19 4 that their dues or fees should not be used to
finance political speech with which they disagree. 195 These cases present the
closest analogy to the compelled speech at issue here. In these cases, the Court
was called upon to balance the right of the union to collect dues from members
and payments in lieu of dues from nonmembers to avoid a "free rider" problem,
while at the same time prohibiting compulsory political speech and compelled
subsidization of political speech. The cases address the issue of contributions to
union political funds but not the issue of determining how that fund will be used
or what candidates will be supported or opposed.
In Abood v. Detroit Board ofEducation, teachers who objected to the use of
union dues for political activities brought suit against both the school board and
the union that was the sole collective bargaining representative of public school
teachers in Detroit. 196 The teachers claimed that the requirement that they
contribute funds to the union that would be used for political speech that they did
not support was an impermissible burden on their First Amendment right of
association. 197 The teachers claimed that they could prevent the union from
making political expenditures "unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining
representative."198

191. See e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1976) (rejecting compelled display of state
motto on license plate); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (rejecting
compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools).
192. See supra Part II.
193. The Court has considered this issue somewhat indirectly as it applies to union members
in the union cases discussed above at Part 111(B) as an element of more general considerations of
consent.
194. An "agency shop" is a workplace in which all the workers are represented by a single
union but not all the workers are required to become union members. Those who do not choose to
become members are required to pay fees equivalent to union dues to support the collective
bargaining activities from which they benefit. For a description of an "agency shop," see Abood v.
DetroitBd. ofEd., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977).
195. E.g., Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007); Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Teachers v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Bhd. of Ry.
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Ry. Emps. Dept.
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
196. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211-12.
197. Id. at 213, 233-34.
198. Id. at 234.
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The Court agreed. The Court based its decision on the absence of consent by
the teachers to the political expenditures.1 9 9 According to the Court:
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no
less an infringement of their constitutional rights. For at the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to
believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State. 200
The Court made it clear that its decision did not deprive the union of the First
Amendment right to engage in political speech, but simply protected the rights of
those who associated in the union to avoid compelled speech. The Court
reasoned:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its
duties as a collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution
requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those
ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the
threat of loss of governmental employment. 201
The Court observed that the application of this principle in practice would
involve "difficult problems in drawing lines between collective bargaining
activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited," but
declined to draw such a line in this case. 202 This opinion is one of the few
instances where the Court attempted to integrate aggregate and entity theories of
association.
Abood provides guidance on the specificity of consent required before
nonmembers' fees could be used to finance the union's political speech. Political
speech requires specific consent to the use of their fees for the union's political
speech. Consent cannot be inferred from their affiliation with the union as their
collective bargaining agent. Simply being a member of the union or a
nonmember who benefitted from the union's collective bargaining on their
behalf does not establish the requisite consent to the use of some part of their
dues for political speech with which they do not agree.
The Court confirmed the essential principle of consent eleven years later in
199. Id. at 235. The Court cited Thomas Jefferson as saying that "'to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical."' Id. at 235 n.31.
200. Id. at 234-35.
201. Id at 235-36.
202. Id. at 236.
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Communication Workers v. Beck, holding that the fees paid by nonmembers to a
union that was the collective bargaining agent in a private sector employer could
not expend those fees on activities unrelated to collective bargaining activities
over the objections of dues-paying nonmember employees. 20 3
The Court revisited the issue of members' consent to political expenditures
in Davenport v. Washington Education Association in 2007.204 Both the State of
Washington and union members brought suit against the public education
employees' union, alleging that the union had violated a state statute requiring
that the union obtain affirmative authorization from nonmember employees
before using their agency-shop fees to make political expenditures. 20 5 The
Supreme Court of Washington held that the affirmative authorization
requirement violated the union's First Amendment rights. 20 6 On appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the Washington State Supreme Court and held that a
nonmember who pays an agency-shop fee must be given an opportunity for
affirmative consent to the use of any portion of this fee for political activities as
required under the state statute and that this statutory requirement did not violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution. 2 07 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia concluded that the affirmative authorization requirement was not a
restriction on the union's First Amendment right of political speech. 20 8 He
rejected the union's claim that the agency fees were union funds on the grounds
that the funds paid by nonmembers were paid under government compulsion. 209
Thus, as applied to a public sector union, the affirmative authorization
requirement is merely "a condition placed upon the union's extraordinary state
entitlement to acquire and spend otherpeople's money." 2 10
Based on this reasoning, Justice Scalia rejected the union's reliance on
campaign finance cases, including Bellotti.2 11 He found that "the union remains
as free as any other entity to participate in the electoral process with all available
funds other than the state-coerced agency fees lacking affirmative
permission." 2 12 Justice Scalia noted that requiring an affirmative authorization is

203. Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
204. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
205. Id. at 183.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 191 ("We hold that it does not violate the First Amendment for a State to
require that its public-sector unions receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before
spending that nonmember's agency fees for election-related purposes.").
208. Id. at 191.
209. Id. at 185.
210. Id. 187 (emphasis in original).
211. Id. at 186-87. He also rejected as erroneous the state supreme court's reliance on Dale
to support the union's expressive association claims, stating that the state statue at issue in this case
"does not compel respondent's acceptance of unwanted members or otherwise make union
membership less attractive." Id. 187 n.2.
212. Id. at 190.
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not burdensome to the nonmembers who wish to do so. 2 13 Justice Scalia
observed that the holding might have been different had the state statute
burdened the union's ability to spend the dues of its own members. 2 14 In that
case, a union might well have been able to rely on Bellotti and the other
campaign finance cases, because the member dues were voluntary and therefore
became the union's money. While this comment is dicta, it is quite suggestive in
the context of a post-Citizens United challenge by a corporate shareholder or
association member to the use of general treasury funds for independent
expenditures. The concept of a general treasury in Citizens United suggests that
Davenport would apply only in the very limited circumstances of an agency
shop fee paid by a nonmember to the collective bargaining agent. Other funds
would be treated as union funds because they had been transferred to the
organization voluntarily even if they had not been transferred for purposes of
supporting the organization's political speech. 2 15
Justice Scalia also suggested that the outcome of the case might be different
if the case had involved a private-sector union. 2 16 He observed that the
distinction between the use of agency fees for collective bargaining activities and
for political speech "is arguably content based," which would support strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment. 2 17 Justice Scalia nevertheless stated that
the majority was not taking the position that it was necessary to distinguish
between public-sector and private-sector unions. 2 18 In doing so, Justice Scalia
raised the specter that the state action doctrine could be invoked to bolster claims
that organization members have no rights once they join or contribute to an
organization unless the deprivation of rights arises from state action. This is in
itself an admission, however indirect, that nonparticipatory association and
compelled political speech do not rest easily in First Amendment jurisprudence.
There are at least three possible responses to an invocation of some version
of the state action doctrine to bolster the holding in Citizens United. One is that
Citizens United itself constitutes state action, a government action that changes
the terms of operation of all entities in ways that negate the constitutional
principle of consent and negate voluntarism as an element of political speech.
The second possible response is that any such invocation of state action would

213. Id. at 187 n.2.
214. Id.
215. In an earlier decision, Justice Scalia applied a version of this argument in the context of
government speech. Justice Scalia distinguished between compelled speech, in which the
government compels an individual to personally express messages with which she disagrees, and
compelled subsidization, in which the government requires an individual to subsidize a message
with which she disagrees that is expressed by a private entity. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n,
544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
216. Davenport,551 U.S. at 190-91.
217. Id. at 190 n.4 (citing Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), as an example of
a content-based distinction by a private-sector union).
218. Id.
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provide little support for Scalia's position. 2 19 The state action doctrine's
appropriate interpretation and application are highly contested. 220 The third
possible response is that a rigid, doctrinaire invocation of state action would be
inconsistent with the constitutional principle of consent grounded in the
language of the first sentence of the Constitution. The use of state action to erect
a barrier against the constitutional role assigned to the people in determining
government legitimacy, especially in the context of elections, would require a
negation of the right of association as well as the right of voluntary political
speech and would be fundamentally inconsistent with the idea that legitimate
government is based on consent. 22 1
This hint that Communications Workers of America v. Beck might be
overruled in some future case suggests that Justice Scalia finds a burden on
political speech arising from contributions to a corporation only where the
government compelled the contribution. If this becomes the law and Beck is
overruled, the scope of the concept of the general treasury would be expanded
and the scope of managerial discretion in the area of entity political speech
consistent with the jurisprudence of expressive association would know no
bounds in the private sector.
As discussed in the next section, Citizens United's negation of even the
limited elements of consent previously found in MCFL and Austin222 strongly
suggests that crafting remedies for compelled speech and compelled
subsidization of speech will depend, in significant part, on developing a First
Amendment theory of participatory association that gives operational meaning to
the constitutional principle of consent. Citizens United makes crafting a
jurisprudence of participatory association more difficult by enhancing
corporations' rights as political speakers and negating the constitutional
significance of shareholders' or members' consent to the managers' uses of
general treasury funds for political speech. For all its rhetorical flourishes about
combating government censorship of political speech, the majority in Citizens
United embraces both nonparticipatory association and compelled political
speech.

219. The White Primary cases, particularly Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), rejected
reliance on the state action doctrine to deny voters their constitutional right to play their
constitutional role as voters.
220. Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/PrivateDistinction, 123 HARv. L.
REV. 1248, 1261-64 (2010). See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection,and Calfornia'sProposition14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
221. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

39-45 (1969) (providing a pervasive critique of state action doctrine on structural grounds).
222. See supra Part III(A).
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V.
CITIZENS UNITED: ASSOCIATION WITHOUT PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL
SPEECH WITHOUT CONSENT
Ciitzens United held that a section 501(c)(4) organization could finance
electioneering communications using its general treasury funds rather than funds
in its PAC.2 2 3 The Court also held that all independent expenditures, but not
contributions to candidates, could be financed using general treasury funds. 224
The Court's holdings might suggest that Citizens United is a narrow case
about the accounting mechanics of campaign finance. This would be wrong.
Citizens United is a very broad case about the control of corporations and their
resources and the use of those resources to influence campaigns, election
outcomes, and the operation of government. As discussed below, the opinion is
based on First Amendment speech claims; an entity theory of association in the
guise of a discussion about the use of "general treasury funds;" acceptance of
broad managerial discretion over the allocation of general treasury funds to
independent expenditures; the express rejection of any limits on the rights of an
entity to make independent expenditures; and the refusal to find constitutional
significance in any rights of shareholders or members to participate in deciding
how to use general treasury funds for political speech by the corporation.
The majority opinion in Citizens United is complex because its meaning can
be understood only if one grasps the structure of the argument rather than
focusing on discrete elements of it. For all the claims that the majority is
protecting speech, the majority opinion extends an entity theory of
nonparticipatory association to political speech that members and contributors
have no right and no opportunity to shape or support or interdict. The Court
generally ignores members and treats associations as the equivalent of
individuals. The power of the Court's reasoning arises from its assertion of a
First Amendment political speech absolutism focused on the rights of entities.
The majority took full advantage of the attenuated development of the
jurisprudence of association, particularly the asymmetry between the attention
devoted to the rights of the entity and the rights of the members. The result was
to remove from the campaign finance jurisprudence those few instances where
the Court considered at least some elements of participatory association,
particularly Austin and MCFL. 2 25 This approach to association enabled the Court
to ignore the jurisprudence of compelled speech, which exists in considerable
tension with the political speech claims made by the majority. 2 26 The majority
based its reasoning on First National Bank v. Bellotti, a case permitting a
corporation to use its general treasury funds to finance ads in a referendum
223. 130 S.Ct. 876, 913 (2010).

224. Id.
225. For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part III(A).
226. For a discussion of compelled speech as a consequence of nonparticipatory association,
see supra Part III(B).
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contrary to state law. 22 7 The majority did nothing to preserve or enhance the
rights of members or shareholders to consent to the decisions made by entity
managers with respect to the entity's political speech. Indeed, as is discussed
later in this section, the majority took the position that protecting members'
rights to participate in organizations' decisions regarding the use of the funds
they contributed to the general treasury is not a compelling government interest
for purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence. This decision, together with the
extension of managerial discretion to the use of general treasury funds for
independent expenditures, permits compelled political speech within
organizations. How the majority achieved this result requires an understanding
of the scope of the entity rights and managerial discretion at the core of the
majority opinion in Citizens United The result is an asymmetrical jurisprudence
of association focused on an entity theory and ignoring any possibility of an
aggregate theory of association.
Citizens United is a politically active section 501(c)(4) organization with an
annual budget of approximately $12 million. 2 28 Most of its funds are raised
through contributions from individuals, but it also accepts contributions from
corporations. 229 It controls a well-funded PAC and several affiliated section 527
organizations that are not classified as PACs for federal election law
purposes. 23 0 Under the reasoning of MCFL, Citizens United could not use its
general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications or independent
expenditures because it accepted corporate contributions. 2 3 1
During the 2008 primary campaign, Citizens United produced and
distributed a ninety-minute video critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who
was, at the time, a candidate to be the Democratic Party's presidential
nominee. 23 2 The video, entitled Hillary: The Movie, had been shown in limited
release in a small number of commercial theaters and was also released on

227. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902-903 (2010). The Court
previously upheld this right in First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).
The importance of Bellotti in the campaign finance jurisprudence of the Roberts Court is even
more apparent when one reads Citizens United in light of Fed Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right To
Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449 (2007). For an analysis of WRTL II, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate
Political Speech and the Balance of Powers: A New Framework for Campaign Finance
Jurisprudencein Wisconsin Right to Life, 27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 267 (2008).
228. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. The majority opinion did not reference Citizens
United's tax status but did provide the information relating to its annual budget.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the PAC
controlled by Citizens United as having "millions of dollars in assets"). On its website, Citizens
United lists three affiliates, one is a section 501(c)(3) organization and two appear to be PACs that
UNITED,
CITIZENS
Do,
We
What
See
candidates.
to
contributions
make
www.citizensunited.org/what-we-do.aspx (last visited July 30, 2011).
231. See supra Part III(A) for a discussion of MCFL and the regulations applicable to
qualified political organizations.
232. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887-88.
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DVD. 23 3 Citizens United wanted the video production made available through
video-on-demand, which ordinarily requires that viewers pay a fee to view a
production. 2 34 Citizens United paid a cable company called "Election '08" $1.2
million to make Hillary: The Movie available to viewers without the viewer
having to pay a fee. 23 5 To promote Hillary: The Movie and its availability
without charge through video-on-demand, Citizens United produced two tensecond ads and one thirty-second ad. 23 6 Both the video and the ads would have
been shown during the period when they would have been treated as
electioneering communications under BCRA and FECA that could not be funded
by Citizens United's general treasury funds. 2 37
Citizens United petitioned the district court for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the enforcement of federal campaign finance laws preventing it from
using its general treasury funds to broadcast the movie, but the district court
denied the petition and instead granted the FEC's motion for summary
judgment. 238 Citizens United then appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted
probable jurisdiction in 2008.239 After the initial oral argument, the Court asked
the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question of whether either or both
Austin or the part of McConnell addressing section 441b should be overruled. 2 40
After the second oral argument, the Court held that the prohibitions on the
use of corporate general treasury funds to finance electioneering
communications 24 1 and independent expenditures 24 2 impermissibly burden
corporations' First Amendment rights. 24 3 According to Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, "We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti
that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity." 2 44 Having rejected such distinctions, the majority
concluded that "[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations. "245 The Court overruled
Austin 24 6 and those parts of McConnell upholding the prohibition on the use of
general treasury
funds used to finance electioneering
corporate
233. Id. at 887.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 887-88.
238. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279 (2008) (holding
FECA § 441b facially constitutional under McConnell). See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 for a
statement of the procedural posture of the case.
239. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
240. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009).
241. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887, 913 (addressing BCRA § 203).
242. Id. at 887 and 913 (addressing FECA § 441b).
243. Id. at 895-97.
244. Id. at 913.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 913 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).

14qngddvihlPhniisiinf)Ntl6.Neemk bnhivers&ySWdiab4Chifigv

2011]

NONPARTICIPA TORY ASSOCIA TION

591

communications. 24 7
The majority in Citizens United rejected the claim that a PAC controlled by
a corporation provided the corporation with a means of exercising its right of
political speech under the First Amendment. 2 48 The majority held that "[s]ection
441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by
a corporation can still speak." 2 49 The majority rested this conclusion primarily
on the observation that "[a] PAC is a separate association from the
corporation."250 The majority then took the position that "PACs are burdensome

alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive
regulations." 25 1 The Court concluded that the "purpose and effect [of § 441b] are
to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect." 2 52 The
majority then linked limits based on the identity of a speaker to content
restrictions:
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. . . .
Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others.

...

As instruments to censor,

these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content. 2 53
The Court did not provide any further reasoning with respect to the parallel
between regulation and prior restraint.
The Court made it clear that it rejected any distinctions between the First
Amendment rights of individuals and corporations, as well as distinctions among
types of corporate entities. 254 The Court rejected any effort to distinguish
wealthy individuals from corporations on the grounds that corporations have
accumulated wealth in part due to special advantages provided under law. 25 5 in
Austin, the Court had defined such "special advantages" as "limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets." 256 While not denying the existence of such distinctions, the majority in
247. Id. (overruling McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003) in
part).
248. Id. at 897-98.
249. Id. at 897.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 898.
253. Id. at 898-99.
254. The Court left for another case on another day the issue of whether foreign corporations
were included in this broad assertion that all corporations are to be alike for purposes of First
Amendment rights of political speech. Id. at 911 ("We need not reach the question whether the
Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation's political process.").
255. Id. at 905.
256. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1989).
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Citizens United denied their constitutional significance, concluding that "[t]his
does not suffice, however, to allow laws prohibiting speech." 2 57 The sole
authority cited for this proposition is Justice Scalia's assertion in his dissent in
Austin that "[i]t is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those
special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights." 25 8 Based on this
rationale, the Court concluded that "[t]he rule that political speech cannot be
limited based on a speaker's wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise
that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech
based on the speaker's identity."259
Consistent with its rejection of distinctions among speakers, the Court
refused to make distinctions among types of speech. Because the majority based
its opinion so centrally on Bellotti, the Court was at great pains to reject the
distinction between the expenditures for a referendum at issue in Bellotti and the
independent expenditures and electioneering communications at issue in Citizens
United:2 60
Bellotti did not address the constitutionality of the State's ban on
corporate independent expenditures to support candidates. In our view,
however, that restriction would have been unconstitutional under
Bellotti's central principle that the First Amendment does not allow
political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity. 26 1
The Court rejected as dicta the Bellotti Court's suggestion, made in a footnote,
that a future Court might find that independent expenditures in candidate
elections could result in corruption sufficient to sustain regulation of
independent expenditures. 262 According to the Court, there was no link between
independent expenditures and corruption or the appearance of corruption, as
"there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate. "263
Even if there were such evidence, Justice Kennedy observed that "[i]ngratiation
and access, in any event, are not corruption." 2 64 In support of this conclusion,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, cited his dissent in McConnell, in which
257. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
258. Id. (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
259. Id at 905.
260. Id at 909.
261. Id at 903.
262. Id. at 909 (referencing First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26,
which states, "The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of
public debts. The case before us presents no comparable problem, and our consideration of a
corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the
quite different context of participation in a public campaign for election to public office. Congress
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.") (citation omitted).
263. Id. Reliance on the record of a different case seems, at the very least, unusual. There was
no evidentiary record in Citizens United
264. Id. at 910.
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he equated "favoritism and influence" with the "responsiveness" on which
"[d]emocracy is premised." 2 65 In any case, the majority took the position that the
appropriate remedy is more speech.26 6
The Court linked its rejection of distinctions among types of speakers and
forms of political speech to a rejection of complex multi-factor tests used to
administer these distinctions. The Court concluded that it could not "resolve this
case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is
central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment." 2 67 The Court took
the position that the FEC has issued too much guidance and that the sheer
volume of campaign finance regulations amounted to an unconstitutional
restraint of freedom of speech due to their complexity. 26 8 Stating that the Court
originally had hoped its opinion in WRTL II would reduce this complexity
through "an objective 'appeal to vote' test for determining whether a
communication was the functional equivalent of express advocacy," 2 69 the Court
observed that "the FEC adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing test to
implement WRTL's ruling." 27 0 This conclusion was based in part on the
assertion that the complexity of election law constitutes an impermissible burden
on political speech akin to a prior restraint. 2 7 1 Based on this analogy between
regulation and prior restraint, the Court determined that the prohibition on a
corporation's use of general treasury funds to finance electioneering
communications and independent expenditures "is an outright ban, backed by
criminal sanctions." 27 2
The majority in Citizens United established the breadth of its holding in its
determination that all of the previously relied upon compelling state interests for
regulating political speech except quid pro quo corruption were impermissible
under the First Amendment. 2 73 The majority briskly dismissed any compelling
state interest based on "protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled
to fund corporate political speech." 2 74 The majority reasoned that recognizing
the rights of dissenting shareholders would give the government the authority to

265. Id at 909-10 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
266. Id. at 911.
267. Id. at 892.
268. Id at 895 (relying on an amicus brief from Seven Former Chairs of the FEC, the Court
states that FEC rules apply to 71 distinct entities and provide rules for 33 types of political
regulations and accepts the Former Chairs' conclusion that "[t]he FEC has adopted 568 pages of
regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771
advisory opinions since 1975.").
269. Id. at 895-96.
270. Id. (citing 11 CFR § 114.15 (2010)).
271. Id at 895-96.
272. Id. at 897.
273. See id.at 903-11.
274. Id. at 911.
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restrict the corporation's political speech.2 7 5 Citing Bellotti, the majority found
"little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 'through the
procedures of corporate democracy."' 2 76 The majority offered no thoughts on
what procedures of corporate democracy it might find most appropriate in the
context of an election campaign.
The only role available for members in the wake of Citizens United is to
listen to organizational speech funded with their money just as citizens who are
not members listen to the organization's speech. The Court makes no reference
to the right of members to speak for themselves, whether individually or through
associations. Instead, the majority reasons that "[b]y suppressing the speech of
manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents
their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on
which persons or entities are hostile to their interests." 2 77
The Court's cursory observations about the rights of members in
associations, and the rhetorical device of referencing "dissenting shareholders"
rather than members, avoid the larger issues that arise from the asymmetrical
theory of association embraced in the majority opinion. This theory arises not
simply from the references to "dissenting shareholders," but more importantly
from the importance of the concept of the general treasury in the opinion. The
operational outcome of Citizens United is to give organization managers
absolute control over the use of organizational resources for whatever
independent expenditures they choose to make. In doing so, it establishes
nonparticipatory association and results in compelled speech, both of which are
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
The majority does not appear to understand that it has defined a category of
organizational members who have no right of political speech in their role as
members of organizations. The great solicitude the majority expresses for
managers of organizations having to cope with what it characterizes as the
burdens of operating a PAC finds no parallel in any solicitude at all for members
denied the right to participate in their associations' decisions with respect to
political speech financed with their money. If PACs are burdensome, and if
PACs are rejected as a mechanism for the corporation that controls the PAC to
speak, why should it be constitutionally permissible to permit the organization to
speak without permitting the members, whether or not they are dissidents, to
have an opportunity to consent or not as they see fit? Does the absence of any
opportunity for consent satisfy the rights of political speech and association
afforded members under the First Amendment? The majority in Citizens United
offers no analytical support for its asymmetrical concept of constitutionally
permissible burdens on political speech. It simply holds that burdens on
organizational managers outweigh the rights of members to participate in their
275. Id.
276. Id. at 911 (quoting FirstNat'l Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).

277. Id. at 907.
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associations so that their political speech is based on consent, not on compulsion.
If consent is treated as a constitutional value linked to participation and
government accountability, then the absence of any reference to rights of
members of associations is a glaring omission in Citizens United. Treating
consent as a constitutional value should be the core principle in developing a
jurisprudence of participatory association that encompasses members' rights as
well as entity rights. This is the important jurisprudential enterprise that the
majority in Citizens United made more difficult. 27 8 The majority focused on
what it characterized as the burdens of operating a PAC on entity managers but
summarily rejected any serious consideration of the burdens that its view of
entity rights imposed on members or shareholders.
VI.
CONSENT IN OPERATION: CRAFTING REMEDIES TO NONPARTICIPATORY
ASSOCIATION AND COMPELLED POLITICAL SPEECH

In light of the holding and the reasoning in Citizens United, the Court's
casual reference to the "ordinary mechanisms of corporate democracy" seems
insufficient at best. 27 9 Crafting a jurisprudence of participatory association that
treats both the entity and the members as speakers is likely to be a lengthy
undertaking. This Part applies the consent principle to the task of crafting
operational remedies to the kind of compelled speech arising from the Court's
entrenchment of nonparticipatory association within the framework of First
Amendment jurisprudence. As this section of the Article suggests, these
operational remedies will vary in the context of single issue nonprofits, complex
nonprofits that engage in multiple activities relating to multiple issues, and
taxable business corporations. This Part suggests that business corporations may
more readily provide certain mechanisms for shareholder voting while complex
nonprofits may find remedies based on creating funds for particular activities
more effective.
Crafting remedies begins with conceptualizing corporate independent
expenditures as a transaction between shareholders, members, or contributors
and the entity. The parties to an independent transaction expenditure are the
members and the entity-which means, in operation, the organization managers.
The elements of an independent expenditure transaction are the decision to
become a member, the decision to use general treasury funds for an independent
expenditure, and the decision of which candidate or candidates to support or
278. Paradoxically, perhaps, those seeking to develop a jurisprudence of participatory
association that prevents compelled political speech might find some comfort in Chief Justice
Roberts' claim in his concurring opinion that stare decisis is subject to analysis based on a
balancing of interests. Id. at 920-21. The work of developing a jurisprudence of participatory
association that does not result in compelled political speech would begin by considering the
interests of members and shareholders and balancing their right of consent against the right of the
entity to speak.
279. Id. at 911 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
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oppose. The elements of the transaction can be understood as decision points
offering members opportunities for consent. Nonparticipatory association results
in compelled political speech because the decision to become a member provides
no role in determining whether to make independent expenditures and which
candidates to support or oppose. The task then becomes to specify the
operational arrangements necessary for expressing consent.
This transactional perspective directs attention to two categories of possible
remedies: a fund mechanism that permits members to allocate their contributions
to activities other than independent expenditures and a mechanism for voting on
corporate policies with respect to independent expenditures. Voting on policies
means consenting to the uses of general treasury funds. Permitting members to
allocate their contributions to particular activities means dividing the general
treasury into funds, each of which is limited to use for particular activities.
The central concept in crafting remedies is the concept of a general treasury.
The important questions relate to how general treasury funds are raised and how
determinations are made to use them for independent expenditures. What are the
sources of general treasury funds? Who decides whether to make independent
expenditures? Who decides what candidates to support and which candidates to
oppose? Who decides how much to spend? Who decides when to spend it?
The Court in Citizens United appears to assume that general treasury
funds "belong" in some way to the organization. The question here is whether
that is an adequate assumption in the context of political speech at the core of the
First Amendment. This assumption fits comfortably with an entity theory of
association, but it fits less comfortably with an aggregate theory.
How does an organization acquire general treasury funds? The funding
element of the transaction is clearest in the case of entities that are funded
primarily by contributions: contributors transfer money to the entity. It is far less
clear in the case of a business corporation that raises funds through sales of
stock, sales of corporate debt, and earnings from operations. The question then
becomes whether shareholders, members, or contributors have continuing claims
on the funds that they invested or contributed and what the nature and scope of
those continuing claims is.
This question can be addressed in the context of political speech by
examining reasonable expectations at the time of the transfer. For what purpose
do people contribute to nonprofits or invest in taxable corporations? What are
their reasonable expectations when they transfer funds to these various entities?
How do these reasonable expectations relate to consent as an operational
principle? As previously noted, Citizens United has redefined these expectations
by removing the statutory prohibition on the use of general treasury funds for
independent expenditures. 2 80
280. This Article will not focus on the situation of those persons who became shareholders or
members or contributors before the Court decided Citizens United This is the kind of situation that
is addressed in transition rules when Congress amends statutes. No such concept applies when the
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Contributors' expectations are clearest in the case of a single-issue
organization like MCFL. 2 8 1 The theory in MCFL is that contributors can be
regarded as having consented when they make a contribution, because the
organization's purpose, its political views, and its commitment to lawful political
action are clear at the time the person makes a contribution.
By contrast, where the contributions are made to a complex nonprofit
organization that pursues multiple purposes through various means, there is no
basis for claims of consent at the time of making a contribution. The contributor
cannot know how the contribution will be used and cannot know whether the
organization will make independent expenditures or the nature of those
expenditures. These complex organizations are engaged in substantial expressive
activity, but they are also engaged in multiple forms of expressive activity as
well as other types of activity. The contributor cannot know at the time of
making a contribution or paying dues how their dues will be allocated among
these various expressive purposes and whether any of their contributions will be
used for political speech in the form of independent expenditures.
A business corporation offers an even more remote connection between
purchasing stock or corporate debt and any basis for characterizing an
investment activity as consent to expressive activity. At the same time,
shareholders in business corporations have at least some voting rights with
respect to policy issues, however attenuated these rights may be.
There are several mechanisms that corporations could use to ensure the
consent of its members to any independent expenditures it makes. PACs
provided an alternative to inferred consent. While Citizens United held that
corporations cannot be required to finance independent expenditures through a
PAC, a corporation could still choose to fund independent expenditures through
a PAC, just as they fund candidate contributions through PACs. However, it
seems highly unlikely that most corporations will choose to do this.
Alternatively, corporations could provide contributors with a mechanism to
designate their contributions for one or more specific purposes. This is a
common concept in nonprofit fundraising, particularly where very large
contributions are made pursuant to a grant agreement with the organization. If
the organization fails to use the contribution for the purpose specified in the
grant agreement, the contributor can bring a breach of contract claim seeking
return of the money contributed.2 8 2
Court strikes down statutes or redefines their meaning.
281. See discussion infra Part IV(A).
282. The issue of donor intent was at the center of the six-year litigation between Princeton
University and the Robertson Family, which claimed that by operating the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs as a center of scholarship the University failed to use the
funds for training students for public service, particularly in foreign affairs. The parties settled the
lawsuit at a cost to Princeton of some $90 million. See Ben Gose, Princeton and Robertson Family
Settle Titanic Donor-Intent Lawsuit, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Dec. 10, 2008

(summarizing the litigation and the settlement). See also PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: ROBERTSON
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Entering into grant agreements with each contributor would, of course, be a
very cumbersome procedure in the case of smaller contributions. For these
contributions, one workable mechanism would be to create a fund to be used
solely for the exempt entity's exempt purpose, excluding independent
expenditures. Citizens United did not, after all, compel organizations to use their
general treasuries for independent expenditures. A fund that is not used for
political speech is a far safer alternative under federal election law than would be
a fund solely for political speech. This kind of a fund, the equivalent of an
internal PAC, could quite easily be characterized as a political committee subject
to reporting and disclosure requirements. 2 83
A fund mechanism, however, would not solve the issue of consent in a
business corporation. There is no structure that would permit a designation of the
purchase price for a particular use at the time of a stock purchase or the purchase
of corporate debt. Even if such a mechanism were to be developed, it is far from
clear that corporate earnings from its business activities could reasonably be
allocated to a particular shareholder's investment. Corporate earnings do not
belong to shareholders. At the same time, using corporate earnings for
independent expenditures based solely on the political preference of organization
managers raises significant questions about corporate operations and the duties
of corporate managers. Creating a fund mechanism in business corporations
would depend on defining a range of new rights that appear inconsistent with
corporate theory and that would not, in any case, offer shareholders much
opportunity for meaningful consent. In the case of nonprofit organizations, the
fund mechanism permits a contributor to opt out of supporting independent
expenditures that the managers decide to make, but it does not permit members
to influence the organization's policy of making independent expenditures rather
than using all of the organization's resources for exempt activities. For members
who wish to influence organizational policy or to have a voice with respect to
which independent expenditures that an organization should make, a fund option
is less useful than is a mechanism for voting on organizational policy.
The second type of mechanism is based on voting on organization policies
with respect to independent expenditures. Internet voting could offer a workable
method of determining shareholder preferences with respect to the use of general
treasury funds for independent expenditures. Thinking of consent in
transactional terms and identifying the elements of consent helps structure this
kind of mechanism. The elements of an independent expenditure transaction are
whether the organization should use general treasury funds for independent
expenditures, how much should the organization commit to this purpose, what
candidates should be supported or opposed and to what extent. Each of these
LAWSUIT, www.princeton.edu/robertson/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (detailing the chronology
of the litigation, with links to relevant documents, including the Settlement Agreement).
283. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 527(f) (2006) (covering what might be described as "embedded
PACs").
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elements is a potential question that could be submitted to a vote of members or
shareholders. Some decisions about which candidates to support or oppose or
how much money to spend raise issues of the appropriate level of specificity in
these questions to members or shareholders. If, for example, a candidate surges
toward the end of a campaign, how can an organization preserve the flexibility to
spend more? In what situations would it want to spend more? In other words,
how specific does member consent have to be? Understanding this element of
consent requires taking account of the dynamics of election campaigns.
Thinking about an independent expenditure transaction as a transaction
beginning with shareholders, members, or contributors suggests that compulsion
and consent are complex concepts that are not easily addressed by any one
remedy. It also highlights the nature of the multiple forms of compulsion that
arise under an entity theory of association in which managers are accorded
unfettered discretion. Nonprofit organizations, whether simple single issue
organizations or complex multipurpose organizations, would have to establish
procedures that do not exist with respect to other aspects of organizational
governance because few exempt entities have members with any form of voting
rights. Similarly, it is far from clear that the mechanisms currently available to
shareholders in business corporations, who vote for members of the board of
directors but do not vote on discrete operational decisions, would be effective in
election campaigns taking place in a short period of time with a defined
termination date, which is Election Day.
In addition to the problem of compelled speech, which is the focus of this
Article, it is worthwhile to refer very briefly to the collateral damage that is
likely to arise from Citizens United. The greatest concern for nonprofit
organizations should be the risk of diversion of resources from exempt activities
to political speech. 284 The only reason for operating as an exempt entity is to
perform activities consistent with exempt status. One form of diversion arises
from the substitution of managers' agendas for the agendas of the
organization. 28 5 This risk is acute in nonprofit corporations because there are
very limited mechanisms for holding managers accountable. Indeed, it may be
even greater in nonprofit corporations than in taxable business corporations

284. See generally Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency:
Designing a Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REv. 675 (2003) (analyzing diversion in terms
of activities unrelated to exempt purposes even when such activities do not provide impermissible
private benefits to organization managers and other insiders).
285. See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from the Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). Professor Henry Hansmann's concept of a
"nondiversion constraint" is based on the need to create sufficient confidence among contributors
that exempt entities will use their contributions or dues for exempt purposes that they will continue
to support organizations in which they play no role in governance. The "nondiversion constraint"
is based on ensuring that organization managers will not use organization funds for personal
benefit.
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because nonprofit organizations so rarely have members with the right to vote on
organizational policies or for the members of the board of directors. Problems of
diversion will become more serious if the appealing prospect of general
treasuries controlled by organization managers attracts greater rent-seeking
demands by officeholders. The majority in Citizens United largely ignored rentseeking and did not link it to diversion of organizational resources. 2 86
The two forms of operational responses discussed in this section-creating
funds within the general treasury and voting on policies relating to making
independent expenditures-offer some concrete expression of consent as a
constitutional principle. Neither mechanism resolves the difficult issue of
balancing the rights of members with the rights of the organizations, and neither
solves the issue of the role of managers and the roles of members in defining this
balance.
VII.
CONCLUSION

Without considering consent mechanisms operating inside organizations,
ordinary people will be deprived of their rights under the Association Clause of
the First Amendment to voluntarily band together in order to amplify their
voices during election campaigns. The Association Clause does not give each
individual absolute rights, but it does give some right to participate without
compelled speech. This is the right that Citizens United makes far more
problematic.
While the operational remedies discussed here are partial responses that do
not restore the rights of members newly burdened by Citizens United, this does
not mean that they are unimportant. Nevertheless, the constitutional stakes
require consideration of their limits. These mechanisms will not resolve the
larger problem of entrenching managerial power over general treasuries that can
now be used for political speech at the core of the First Amendment. They do not
safeguard the role of ordinary people as the arbiters of system legitimacy. These
issues require a jurisprudence of association that takes account of both entities
and their members and that treats consent as an important constitutional principle
in the area of political speech. Ascribing to ordinary people, including members
of expressive associations, a role only as listeners, and failing to recognize their
role as speakers, is corrosive of the principle of consent that lies at the heart of
the Constitution. The distinction between speakers and listeners is a far more
serious matter than the distinctions among entities that the Court condemned in
286. Citizens United discounts the constitutional significance of corruption apart from the
quid pro quo corruption that the Court appears to equate with bribery. Questions of which party
takes the initiative in transactions amount to quid pro quo corruption cannot be answered in the
abstract, but they should at least consider the possibility of extortion as well as of bribery. The
current law of coordination is unlikely to interdict most of these transactions and is especially
unlikely to interdict them during the campaign. See 11 C.F.R §§ 109.20-.22 (2010) (providing
rules relating to the coordination of expenditures).
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Citizens United. Whether or not Citizens United is overruled by a different court
in a different time, these larger issues of legitimate government require a much
more participatory jurisprudence of association so that ordinary people can claim
the rights of the Association Clause of the First Amendment, and thereby reclaim
both their rights under the First Amendment's speech clause and the operational
significance of consent as a constitutional principle.
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